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The current peace process between the Colombian government 
of President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (“FARC-EP”) has been in 
progress for the past five years and recently led to a historic Final 
Agreement between the two parties signed in Havana, Cuba, 
August 24, 2016. One of the main points on the agenda throughout 
the negotiations has been finding a solution to the country’s 
problem with illicit drugs. Both the government and the FARC 
themselves have recognized the FARC’s involvement in the illicit 
drug industry. This has led to the negotiations on how the FARC 
can now work with the government to put an end to the industry 
that has plagued the country for so long. Within these negotiations, 
there have been indications that the government may be preparing 
to pardon the FARC’s narcotrafficking crimes by connecting them 
to the group’s political crimes. This article focuses on the FARC’s 
involvement in narcotrafficking. As an insurgent group committing 
the political crime of rebellion, the FARC’s crime of rebellion 
qualifies for certain special treatment (i.e., amnesty and pardon) 
because of the political motive of the crime. Whether that special 
treatment can be extended to the crime of narcotraffic is a separate 
and important question. This article looks at whether the FARC’s 
narcotrafficking can legally be considered a crime connected to 
their political crime of rebellion. According to the amnesty law 
issued by the Colombian congress as a result of the peace 
agreement, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace will address this 
discussion of whether the crimes can be connected. In this article, 
we support this decision by the Congress. Considering that a 
deeper analysis of the full extent of the FARC’s participation in 
narcotrafficking is required to answer this question, there must be 
room for investigation and application of legal criteria to arrive at 
the right answer—the one that is closest to the truth.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For more than five decades, Colombia has suffered a domestic 
armed conflict. Different illegal armed groups have participated in 
this conflict against the government. One of these armed groups is 
the oldest guerrilla group in Latin America: Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia—the People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo) known 
globally as the FARC.1 Around 2010, the current President of 
Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, initiated conversations with this 
armed guerrilla group with the intention of reaching a peace 
agreement.2 In August 2012, the Colombian government officially 
announced that they had reached an agreement with the FARC to 
begin formal negotiations.3 On the agenda for negotiation were six 
items, one of those–Point Four–focuses on the goal of ending the 
illicit drug trade in Colombia, and in so doing, refers to the issue of 
the FARC’s involvement in the illicit drug trade.4 That issue–the 
FARCs involvement in drug trafficking and its legal consideration 
as a connected crime to the political crime of rebellion–is the 
subject of this article. 
In November 2016, both parties arrived at a final agreement on 
all six points of the agenda constituting “The Final Agreement for 
the Termination of Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and 
Lasting Peace” (Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto 
y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera).5 Point Four of 
the agreement recognized the involvement of the FARC in the 
illegal drug trade. However, it was careful to refer to it in a manner 
that implied all the involvement was strictly tied to the rebellion. 
“Rebellion” is a political crime that consists of using arms to 
overthrow the national government, or to suppress or modify the 
constitutional or legal regime in force.6 As established in the 
 
     1  Secretariado Nacional de las FARC-EP, Quienés Somos y Por Qué 
Luchamos, FARC-EP, http://www.farc-ep.co/nosotros.html 
     2  JUNE S. BEITEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42982, PEACE TALKS IN 
COLOMBIA 15-16 (2015). 
     3   Id. 
     4     See id. at 22. 
5     Id. at 15-16. 
6  ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WARFARE AND STATE FORMATION 26 (Jari 
Eloranta et al. eds., 2016). 
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Colombian Constitution as well as the Final Peace Agreement, in 
contexts such as peace processes, perpetrators of rebellion and 
other such political crimes can receive the benefits of amnesty, 
pardon, and exemption from extradition. In addition, in most cases, 
common crimes perpetrated by the insurgent groups that are 
deemed connected to the group’s political crimes receive the same 
benefits. 
Neither the Final Agreement nor the amnesty law issued under 
the Agreement expressly state that the drug trafficking committed 
by the FARC constitutes a connected crime.7 However, the 
language used when referring to the relationship of this armed 
group with drug trafficking, as well as the inclusive criteria laid out 
for the determination of the connectedness of the conduct, give a 
strong indication that the FARC’s involvement in drug trafficking 
will be considered a connected crime. For example, this would be 
achieved by considering drug trafficking a crime related to the 
political crime of rebellion by stating that the crime was carried out 
solely for the purpose of financing the rebellion, and that the 
proceeds were used exclusively to this end.  
In this paper, by applying universally accepted tests, and 
Colombian case law, we arrive at specific results that the FARC’s 
involvement in drug trafficking cannot be excused as a connected 
crime to the rebellion. This article does not aim to present a 
definitive answer regarding the extent of the FARC´s involvement 
in the drug trafficking industry—that is a question various 
governments and organizations have been trying to answer for over 
thirty years. Instead, it will lay out facts that introduce doubt as to 
whether the FARC’s involvement in narcotrafficking went beyond 
being merely a tool to commit rebellion. 
Given the relationship of narcotraffic with the Colombian 
armed conflict, the need for truth and reconciliation, and for a 
“stable and permanent” peace, we argue that it is essential to have 
a serious investigation, analysis, and discussion before the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace on the issue of narcotraffic and the true 
extent of the FARC’s involvement. 
This article is organized into three parts. Part I contextualizes 
the FARC´s history and its different phases as an armed group in 
 
7  See generally id. 
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Colombia, as well as its involvement with the illicit drug business 
throughout the decades. Part II presents the concept of political and 
connected crime through the different theories developed 
worldwide culminating in the historic and legal development of 
political and connected crime in Colombia. Part III, applies those 
theories to the issue at hand—whether the FARC’s involvement in 
narcotrafficking could be a connected crime. Finally, we conclude 
that regardless as to which test is applied, for phases four to six, 
the FARC´s narcotrafficking activities could not qualify as 
connected crimes to the political crime of rebellion.  
 
II. THE FARC—THE OLDEST GUERRILLA GROUP IN 
THE AMERICAS, AND ITS INVOLVEMENT WITH 
THE MOST PROFITABLE ILLEGAL BUSINESS ON 
THE CONTINENT. 
A.  History of the FARC 
The origin of the armed conflict in Colombia is not necessarily 
connected with the guerrilla movement8 as we know it today. The 
history of violence goes back to the early 1900s and the 
sociopolitical realities of Colombia as a new independent 
republic.9 Both the causes of the violence and the actors carrying it 
out have evolved during the course of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries; the guerrilla actors born in the 1960s have sustained 
the fight over the longest period in history, and the FARC10 has 
been one of the most prominent contributors to the violence the 
country has suffered. 
Though it began before the Cuban Revolution, the guerrilla 
movement in Colombia was heavily influenced by that event and 
 
8    See generally Fernán E. González, The Colombian Conflict in Historical 
Perspective, 14 ACCORD 10, 10-15 (2004) (discussing the historical context of 
the current Colombian armed conflict). 
9    See generally John H. Coatsworth, Roots of Violence in Colombia: Armed 
Actors and Beyond, REVISTA HARV. REV. OF LATIN AM., Spring 2003, at 3, 3-7. 
10    Id. 
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the Communist Party.11 The guerrilla movement was organized as 
a response to the accelerated economic development model 
implemented in Colombia. The model was to maximize capital by 
the redistribution of agricultural lands to a select few, and the 
industrialization of that land.12  “This economic model led to the 
creation of a ‘peasant guerrilla’ discontent with the mal-use, 
misuse, and under-use of human resources with the 
underutilization of the country’s best lands.”13 
This guerrilla movement started in Colombia’s southern 
regions, in the Department of Tolima where the peasants colonized 
themselves.14 In September 1964, the different armed groups 
created a coalition called the Guerrilla South Block.15 This 
coalition was transformed into Las Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia or the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia–the FARC–a year and a half later.16 The FARC 
became the peasants’ refuge from the repression of La Violencia;17 
and their collective way of self-defense.18 From the beginning, the 
FARC and the Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista 
Colombiano or “PCC”) were independent and separate 
organizations, despite both maintaining a relationship based on the 
Marxism-Leninism ideology.  
 
 11 Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, La Insurgencia Armada: Raices y 
Perspectiva, in AL FILO DEL CAOS: CRISIS POLÍTICA EN LA COLOMBIA DE LOS 
AÑOS 80 411, 411-43 (Francisco Leal Buitrago & Leon Zamosc eds., 1991).  
 12 EDUARDO L. MONTERO & DALE W. ADAMS, ALGUNAS CONSIDERACIONES 
SOBRE REFORMA AGRARIA EN REGIONES DE MINIFUNDIO: UN EJEMPLO 
COLOMBIANO, CON BIBLIOGRAFIA REFERENTE A LA SITUATION COLOMBIANA 69 
(1965).  
 13  JAMES J. BRITTAIN & JAMES PETRAS, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA-PEOPLE’S ARMY (FARC-EP): 
A HISTORY OF RADICALISM IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, IN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN COLOMBIA: THE ORIGIN AND DIRECTION THE FARC-EP 7 (2009). 
14   GONZALO SANCHEZ & RICARDO PENARANDA, PASADO Y PRESENTE DE LA 
VIOLENCIA EN COLOMBIA 362 (1987).   
15   Roman Ortiz, Guerrilla Y Narcotrafico en Colombia, 22 REV. SEG. PÚB.  
1, 9 (2000), available at 
http://www.ugr.es/~ceas/America%20Latina/Guerrilla%20y%20narcotrafico%2
0en%20Colombia.pdf. 
16    Id.  
17    La Violencia is a decade between 1948 to 1958 of political and economic 
violence in Colombia. See BRITTAIN & PETRAS, supra note 13, at 6.  
18    Id. at 8. 
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Marxism-Leninism is a dogma based on the theory and tactics 
of the proletarian revolution.19  “This dogma rises out of the 
struggles of the working and oppressed people and promotes their 
revolution against capitalism and imperialism.”20 The FARC 
adopted this dogma as a peasant movement campaigning for land 
reform, fighting for better distribution of the wealth in the 
country,21 and promoting a change of the economic model to 
communism.22  
The FARC, the oldest revolutionary movement in Colombia,23 
has fought against the State for more than five decades putting the 
group through different historical, sociological, and political 
challenges under which it has had to adapt and transform in order 
to survive and sustain its campaign.  It started as a “ragtag 
movement committed to land reform, the FARC has developed 
into a well-founded, capable fighting force, known more for its 
brutal tactics than its Marxists-Leninist influenced political 
program.”24 Historians describe four phases of this group.25 
However, it is necessary to add three more phases when 
considering the transformation that has occurred over the past two 
decades. 
1. Phase One: Germination and Consolidation (1962-1973)  
The FARC was created from a peasant group located in the 
departments of Tolima, Huila, Valle, and Cauca in the southern 
 
 19 Victor Barraza, Foundations of Leninism, MARXIST INTERNET ARCHIVE 
(May 2008), https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1924/ 
foundations-leninism/ch02.htm.  
 20    Id.  
 21 ¿Qué es la Conferencia Nacional de las Guerrilleros [What is the 
National Conference of Guerillas?]?, FARC-EP, http://www.farc-ep.co/octava-
conferencia/que-es-la-conferencia-nacional-de-guerrilleros.html. 
22    Central Report to the Expanded Plenary of the Central Major State of 
the FARC-EP, FARC-EP (Oct. 6-20, 1983), http://www.farc-ep.co/pleno/pleno-
ampliado-farc-ep-octubre-6-20-de-1983.html. 
 23 See generally Secretariado Nacional de las FARC-EP, supra note 1. 
 24 George J. Tenet, Statement by the Director of Central Intelligence Before 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Worldwide Threat 2001: 
National Security in a Changing World, (Feb. 2001) https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/speeches-testimony/2001/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html. 
 25 Gilberto Vieira, Colombia: Combinación De Todas Las Formas De 
Lucha (Entrevista con Marta Harnecker), BIBLIOTECA POPULAR, Oct. 1988. 
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region of Colombia.26 Influenced by the communist economic and 
political model, its purpose was to promote an economic and 
political change through refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the 
Colombian government as representatives of the people.27  
From its inception, the PCC funded FARC activities, aimed at 
harassing the government in order to achieve their purpose.28 This 
strategy shifted the violence in Colombia from violence with 
bureaucratic underpinnings during the period of La Violencia,29 to 
violence with strong ideological underpinnings.30  
During this germination and consolidation phase, the FARC 
armed activities were always executed within the limits of the 
territories colonized by its members,31 and its military offensive 
was of rural character.  The military objective was the Colombian 
Army,32 since the FARC was established as a collective self-
defense group by the peasant communities in the south of the 
country who organized themselves for protection against the 
extreme political and militaristic coercion by the government 
during the period of La Violencia.33  
2. Phase Two: Crisis and Division (1973-1980)  
During the second national conference of guerrillas,34 the 
FARC’s military plan was modified to incrementally increase the 
 
 26 See BRITTAIN & PETRAS, supra note 13, at 8. 
 27 See DANIEL PÉCAUT, GUERRA CONTRA LA SOCIEDAD 28 (1st ed. 2001).  
 28 BRITTAIN & PETRAS, supra note 13, at 8.  
 29 Bureaucratic violence presents itself as the bastion of status quo, and 
operates within a type of organization that by the guidelines of conduct 
demanded within, it behaves as an efficient mechanism to dissolve or neutralize 
protests of all kinds; whether as citizens or individuals, whether within the 
public or private sphere, whether for political, economic or other reasons. See 
Edgar Straehle, En torno a la violencia burocrática: observaciones sobre uno de 
los rostros de la violencia contemporánea, 4 ANUARI DEL CONFLICTE SOCIAL 
427 (2015). 
 30 SANCHEZ & PENARANDA, supra note 14. 
 31 Id.  
 32 Id.  
 33 See DANIEL PÉCAUT, GUERRA CONTRA LA SOCIEDAD 36-39 (1st ed. 
2001), http://www.mamacoca.org/docs_de_base/La_Representacion_Social_del 
_ narcotrafico/PecautDaniel_Guerra_Contra_la_Sociedad_EdEspasa_2001.pdf. 
 34 The “National Conference of Guerrillas” is a national meeting held by the 
FARC, where the guerrilla group discusses the “current phenomena that affect 
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number of members and fronts (frentes móviles)35 to distribute 
their presence across the country. The goal was to expand the 
military activities to other regions36 but this plan translated into a 
weakening of the military offensive and a slow growth of its 
presence in the territory.37 
The PCC, Cuba, and the USSR funded the FARC during this 
phase.38 The FARC, however, was only considered as a “strategic 
reserve” of affiliates for the PCC in the probable scenario that a 
dictatorship or extreme right government would take power in 
Colombia39 as had happened in several Latin American countries. 
3. Phase Three: Rebound and Boom (1980-1989)  
Towards the end of 1970s, the expansion of the fronts to other 
territories led to the rebound of the FARC, which grew from nine 
to eighteen fronts by 1982.40 In May of 1982, the Seventh Guerrilla 
conference took place. There, the FARC designed the ultimate 
military objective of war against the State: surround and take over 
the capital, Bogotá.41 In order to achieve this ultimate objective, 
the FARC needed 16,000 members, enough food for the 
population in the city, and to successfully provoke a civilian 
uprising against the Government.42  
 
the Colombian society.” In the conference, the group discuss the action plan to 
be taken regarding that phenomena as well as the revolutionary process and the 
military and political confrontation. 
 35 The fronts are units of the FARC that were implemented as a strategy to 
go to other parts of the Colombian territory and to find supporters. Their purpose 
was to expand the cause. 
 36 BRITTAIN & PETRAS, supra note 15, at 13.  
 37 JAMES D. HENDERSON, VICTIMA DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN: LA HISTORIA DE 
COMO EL NARCOTRÁFICO DESTRUYO LA PAZ EN COLOMBIA 185 (Siglo del 
Hombre 1st ed. 2012).  
 38 Luis Fernando Trejos Rosero, Dos Momentos en la Actividad Política 
Internacional de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército 
del Pueblo (FARC-EP: Un Análisis desde la Categoría de Actor no Estatal 1 
ESPACIO REGIONAL 99, 104-105 (2013). 
 39 Id.  
 40 Ricardo Vargas, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
and the Illicit Drug Trade, TNI (June 7, 1999), 
https://www.tni.org/my/node/1464. 
 41 HENDERSON supra note 37, at 197. 
 42 Id.  
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To carry out this ultimate military objective, the FARC 
followed the plan designed during the ‘70s. The FARC grew 
without any problems between 1982 and 1986 to the point of 
increasing its membership by twenty-five percent.43 However, the 
socio-political scenario was not only stirred up by the FARC-EP; 
the M-19 group44 executed significant operations like the hostage 
situation at the Embassy of The Dominican Republic, which 
demonstrated the power of guerrilla groups in Colombia.  
The significant growth in membership, followers of guerrilla 
groups, and escalation of the confrontation with the Colombian 
Army led the government to implement a policy of repression 
across the territory, a policy that some compared to Brazil and 
Argentina’s extreme-right government’s policies.45 By 1982, the 
increase in violence motivated a stand from the government to 
resolve the armed conflict with a peace agreement. The 
government under President Belisario Betancur46 initiated 
negotiations with all the guerrilla groups: ELN,47 EPL,48 the 
FARC, and others. As a result, the Government issued a General 
Amnesty Law to incentivize demobilization and, from there, 
reached a cease-fire Agreement in 1984 with all the guerrilla 
groups, including the FARC.49 
The FARC created the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica or 
“UP”), a political party, which became the political branch of the 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 The M-19 was an insurgent Colombian movement originated as a protest 
against the alleged fraud of the presidential elections of the April 19, 1970. 
 45 LEONGÓMEZ, supra note 11, at 432 n.21.  
 46 Colombian President Belisario Betancur’s term in office lasted from 
August 7, 1982 to August 7, 1986. 
 47 El Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), National Liberation Army in 
English, is an insurgent guerrilla organization operated in Colombia. It is 
defined by a Marxist-Leninist orientation and pro-revolution Cuban ideology. 
 48 El Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), or Popular Liberation Army in 
English, was a Colombian guerrilla group that formed part of the internal armed 
conflict with a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Though founded in February 1967, 
the EPL did not initiate military action until 1968 in Antioquia (the Urabá and 
Bajo Cauca regions). Later, it expanded into the departments of Córdoba and 
Sucre and the region of Magdalena Medio until its demobilization in 1991.  
 49 Álvaro Francisco Patrón Marchena & Werlington Rojas Hernández, 
Evolución y Situación Actual de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC), NUEVA GRANADA MIL. UNIV. (2012). 
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guerrilla group50 as part of the peace negotiations with President 
Betancur’s government. The FARC and the UP movements 
allowed the guerrillas to leave behind its peasant group image 
guided by the PCC (whom had abandoned the use of force as an 
option by the time the peace negotiations took place).51  The UP’s 
birth marked the FARC’s rupture from the PCC and it exposed the 
FARC’s political independence, despite the fact that the FARC still 
promulgated a socialist/communist agenda separating them from 
the PCC which was a legitimate Colombian political party 
participating in government and society.52  
4. Phase Four: Deterioration and Delegitimisation (1989-
1993)  
The 1984 Cease Fire Agreement came to an end as result of 
acts of harassment against the State executed by the FARC, as well 
as the assassination of UP members by paramilitaries with the 
alleged participation of the Colombian Army.53 This deterioration 
of the peace talks led to the formation of the Simón Bolívar 
Guerilla Coordinating Board (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón 
Bolivar  or “CGSB”), which brought together all the guerrillas 
groups54 to advance their campaign. 
During this period, other armed actors appear in the history of 
Colombia, intensifying and diversifying the violence.55 The 
guerrilla movement was a relevant actor in intensifying the 
violence, particularly the FARC. The guerrillas, however, were 
unable to gain direct and massive support for the insurgent project 
from the Colombian people.56 
 
 50 HENDERSON supra note 37, at 13. 
 51 ROSERO, supra note 38, at 110. 
 52 Id.at 104.  
 53 See generally id. at 103. 
 54 MARCHENA & HERNANDEZ, supra note 49, at 13.   
 55 Some of the other armed groups during the history of the Colombia 
internal armed conflict, are: Quintin Lame, M-19, PRT, MIR Patria, EPL, ELN, 
and AUC. See Int’l Crisis Grp. [ICG], Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the 
ELN, at 7, ICG Latin America Report N°8 (Oct. 4, 2002). 
 56 SANCHEZ & PENARANDA, supra note 14, at 15. 
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 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the FARC stopped receiving 
the same support, particularly the financial support;57 this forced 
acquisition of funds from other sources. The FARC increased its 
tactics of kidnapping and extortion of the Colombian population,58 
as well as its involvement in the illegal drug trafficking industry, in 
order to finance its operations.59  
The FARC’s militarization of the insurgent project, the 
Government’s policy of annihilation of the leftist movement, and 
the proliferation of violence across the board, changed the 
perception of the guerrillas in the eyes of the Colombian people 
delegitimizing the insurgent project.60    
5. Phase Five: Reorganization and Redirection (1993-1998)  
By 1993, the FARC had reorganized both its political and 
military strategies. It had forty-eight fronts around the country,61 
increasing in control of great number of small towns, urbanized the 
conflict by positioning a great number of members to the cities—
especially Bogotá, and implemented large-scale military 
operations.62  
Due to the loss of international supporters, in order to finance 
its operations, the group used the relocation of the coca production 
to the south of the country–FARC territory–to its advantage. The 
guerrilla implemented a tax on coca buyers.63 Even after the drug 
cartels from Medellín and Cali were dismantled in the ‘90s, the 
coca production and the cocaine business kept on growing and the 
FARC continued controlling those territories.64 The FARC’s 
continued growth as an organization during this period points to 
the conclusion that it became more involved in the illegal drug 
operations with many theorizing the drug trade became the group’s 
main source of economic resources. 
 
 57 See Luis Monroy Gonzalez, Consecuencias Regionales del Conflicto en 
Colombia, WASHINGTON COLEGIO INTERAMERICANO DE DEFENSE 34, 34 
(2010).  
 58 SANCHEZ & PENARANDA, supra note 14. 
 59 González, supra note 8.  
 60 PÉCAUT, supra note 33, at 172. 
 61 ROSERO, supra note 38, at 106. 
 62 See ROSERO, supra note 38, at 102. 
 63 MARCHENA & HERNANDEZ, supra note 49, at 14. 
 64 Id. 
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 During this period the Colombian government lost control of 
great parts of the territory causing criminal activity and the 
production of illicit drugs to increase substantially.65 The drug 
business spread its ink at all levels of Colombian society all the 
way up to the highest office. The President elected in 1994, 
Ernesto Samper-Pizano, was exposed to scandal immediately after 
taking office.66 It was uncovered that Samper received drug money 
to finance his electoral campaign.67  
The “drugalization”68 of the Colombian society–the levels of 
illegality and the lack of legitimacy of the Colombian 
Government–created the best socio-political circumstances both 
nationally and internationally, during the FARC’s existence, to 
achieve their ultimate military objective. The FARC had become 
economically and militarily autonomous and self-sustaining as a 
result of its role in this crisis.69   
6. Phase Six: Military and Economic Power (1998-2002)  
Towards the end of the ‘90s, the inefficiency of Samper’s 
Government due to the scandal for receiving drug money to 
finance his campaign, allowed the FARC to reach the peak of its 
military capacity to achieve the objective to overthrow the 
Colombian government.70 In 1998, the state of violence in 
Colombia was so high that President Pastrana was elected under 
the agenda of negotiating a peace agreement.71 The peace talks 
were achieved in exchange for several benefits: the warrants for 
arrest on numerous FARC leaders were suspended, and a piece of 
the Colombian territory was demilitarized for the FARC to 
control.72 The peace conversations took place in El Caguán,73 or 
 
 65 HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 173. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Drugalization is a term created to refer to the phenomenon of the drugs 
and drug-business affecting every aspect and sector of the Colombian society. 
 69 González, supra note 8, at 34.   
 70 HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 172. 
 71 Id. at 211. 
    72  Id. 
    73  “La zona de despeje” was equivalent to 42.319 km
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departments of Meta and Caquetá. Germán Hislén Giraldo Castaño, Apuntes 
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zona de despeje, over the course of three years. The FARC, 
however, intensified its military activities against the State and the 
civilians during these talks, and El Caguán became the center of 
operations for their trafficking businesses:74 drugs and arms.  
Again, the FARC increased its extortion and kidnapping tactics 
against the civilians in the country; it also escalated its attacks 
against the Colombian Army and police forces, especially in the 
municipalities strategically located in the drug-trafficking areas.75 
As the guerrilla groups continued their campaign and gained more 
control over the remote areas of the country and the drug-
trafficking business increased in Colombia,76 the FARC’s 
economic and military power increased. As consequence, the peace 
conversations failed despite the Government’s efforts to achieve a 
political solution to the armed conflict in the country.77   
7. Phase Seven: Crackdown on the FARC (2002-2012)  
By the end of Pastrana’s Government in 2002, Colombia was 
the primary base of the global cocaine industry.78 Guerrilla groups 
controlled most of the municipalities where the coca grew79 and 
the FARC’s involvement in the business also increased.80 
Additionally, the number of murders and kidnappings were higher 
than ever. Colombia was considered the kidnapping capital of the 
world due to the FARC’s campaign.81 
As a result, the Colombian people started to unite and protest 
against the FARC,82 and the European Union and the United States 
 
Acerca del Canje de Prisioneros en la Historia de Colombia, 15 Grafia 106, 122 
(2015). 
     74  MARCHENA & HERNANDEZ, supra note 49, at 15.  
    75  Id. 
    76  Due to the U.S.’s plan to eradicate coca fields in Bolivia and Peru. See 
generally Jeremy Bigwood & Phillip Coffin, Coca Eradication, Inst. for Policy 
Studies (Oct. 6, 2005), https://ips-dc.org/coca_eradication/. 
    77  González, supra note 8, at 35. 
    78  Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, Colombia’s Civil Conflict, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict. 
    79   Id.  
    80    GARRY LEECH, REBELS: FARC: THE LONGEST INSRUGENCY 83 (2011). 
    81  HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 228. 
 82 Cacerolazo Contra Las FARC, EL TIEMPO (Jan. 30, 2002, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1338501. 
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listed the FARC as a terrorist organization for their known links to 
narcotrafficking, kidnapping, and violations of International 
Humanitarian Law.83  
President Uribe, who promised to debilitate the guerrilla 
groups, especially the FARC, was elected in 2002, and a military 
campaign was put in place against all the groups involved in the 
armed conflict.84 The FARC was cracked down on during Uribe’s 
government; its membership was reduced to half, the Colombian 
army took control over a great number of remote municipalities 
considered guerrilla’s territories, and the FARC leaders were 
neutralized by detention or elimination in the battlefield.85 
It has been recognized that the current peace process, 
negotiated with President Santos, is only a consequence of the 
crackdown of the FARC during the previous government. Thus, 
Uribe’s policy to debilitate the FARC’s military indicates that the 
group had the opportunity to achieve the objective designed in the 
1970s–overthrow the government–during the 1990s’ state of chaos 
and insecurity, but it was not carried out, rather the objective 
seems to have been abandoned. 
B.  FARC and Narcotraffic 
1. The origins of the relationship of the FARC with 
narcotraffic 
Around the 1970s, Colombian cartels initiated the promotion of 
coca crops in Colombia when acquiring the coca base from other 
countries turned impossible.86 At its outset, the FARC purposefully 
refrained from any involvement with drugs or drug trafficking87 
 
 83 ROSERO, supra note 38, at 110-12. 
    84     Id. 
    85    Cuatro claves del Estado que pusieron a las Farc en su peor momento, 
EL TIEMPO (Nov. 6, 2011, 1:58 AM), 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-10713652; Los golpes más 
contundentes dados en los últimos años a las Farc, EL ESPECTADOR (Nov. 4, 
2011, 10:50 PM), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/los-golpes-
mas-contundentes-dados-los-ultimos-anos-farc-articulo-309633.  
 86 War and Drugs in Colombia, 11 CRISIS GROUP LATIN AMERICA REPORT 
1, 4 (Jan. 27, 2005). 
 87  Id. at 8. For instance when in 1978, narcotraffickers distributed seeds 
among peasants in Caquetá, the FARC banned its use.  
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believing that any involvement with drugs would undermine their 
insurgent purpose.88 This opposition, however, did not last. Due to 
the structural change caused by the military plan and objective 
design created in the ‘70s and implemented in the ‘80s,89 the story 
of the relationship between the organization and narcotraffic 
began.   
In 1982, in its seventh conference, the FARC announced its 
intention to move from a defensive approach to an offensive one.90 
To this end, the organization aimed at shifting into a 
“Revolutionary Army.”91  This required changes not only in 
strategy and structure, as mentioned above, but also in the 
financing sources.  These developing circumstances, as well as the 
interest of wining the support of the population (which was mainly 
comprised of farmers who derived their wage from the product of 
illicit crops), facilitated the conditions to open the door to drugs.  
Taxing the coca buyers was a starting point but never an 
ending point. A ten to fifteen percent per kilogram tax was 
established as the gramaje—that is the amount charged by the 
FARC to the coca buyers.92 In the ‘90s taxation was extended to 
other stages and participants in the drug business.93  Growers and 
harvesters had to pay the FARC as well. By the ‘90s, the use of 
illegal routes by narcotraffickers to transport both essential 
chemicals for the processing of coca and the final product were 
also on the FARC’s list of things taxed.94 
 
 88 Thomas R. Cook, The Financial Arm Of The FARC: A Threat Finance 
Perspective, 4 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 19, 22 (Spring 2011). Others affirm that 
getting involved with the drug business ignored FARC´s ideology that went 
against the “exploitation by free-market traffickers.”  
 89  See id. (explaining that for those who sustained that as the FARC arrived 
to a new territory, it propelled Lockheed to win over the population). 
 90 Id. at 21.  
 91 Séptima Conferencia De las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP (May 4-14, 1982), http://www.farc-
ep.co/septima-conferencia/septima-conferencia-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-
revolucionarias-de-colombia-ejercito-del-pueblo.html. 
 92 War and Drugs in Colombia, supra note 86, at 8. 
 93 Juan Guillermo Ferro & Graciela Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra: 
las FARC-EP Entre la organización y la política, 15 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS 
SOCIALES 173, 174 (2002).  
 94 War and Drugs in Colombia, supra note 86, at 8. 
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 This means that the FARC´s link with narcotraffic survived 
both the tension between the guerilla group and the Medellín 
Cartel,95 and the emergence of the paramilitary groups78—who 
took over the FARC´s former position of protecting the cartel´s 
illicit crops. Through all this, the FARC managed to maintain and 
gain control of over thirty-seven percent of the small towns in 
Colombia, and of a great majority of the coca municipalities.96  
2. Beyond the gramaje 
By 1998, the FARC had monopolized the market in certain 
areas of Colombia such as Caquetá, ordering the farmers to sell at 
a specific price and only to the local FARC fronts. 97  The scope of 
the FARC´s participation in narcotraffic, however, is still 
uncertain. There are different positions on the matter; some, going 
as far as to assimilate this group with the narcotraffic 
organizations, based on what they consider an intrinsic and 
indivisible relationship between them. Although, it is not clear that 
the FARC’s involvement in narcotrafficking shifted them from 
their original political motivations, what is clear is that there is 
enough evidence to infer that FARC´s participation in narcotraffic 
goes beyond what they have admitted to—the gramaje.  
The FARC has maintained that their only involvement in 
narcotrafficking was the gramaje, and explicitly stated during the 
peace negotiations that they did not participate in any of the stages 
of drug cultivation or distribution. In 2011, Alfonso Cano (FARC 
commander), declared: “according to the documents and decisions 
that rule us, no Farian front is allowed to cultivate, process, 
commercialize, sell or consume hallucinogens or psychotropic 
substances. Whatever else is said, is just propaganda.”98 In the 
 
 95 The tension between the FARC and the cartels who ran the illegal drug 
trade resulted in the alliance of the cartels and the paramilitary groups. This new 
alliance ousted the FARC from control of the farmers who produced the illicit 
crops. That control was given to the paramilitary groups. See also Susan 
Virginia Norman, Narcotization as Security Dilemma: The FARC and Drug 
Trade in Colombia, 41 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 638 (2018). 
 96 ROSERO, supra note 38, at 10. 
 97 War and Drugs in Colombia, supra note 86, at 8. 
 98 Siempre Será Posible Construir Escenarios de Negociación con el 
Gobierno, PÚBLICO (June 11, 2011), http://www.publico.es/ 
internacional/siempre-sera- posible-construir-escenarios.html.  
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context of peace negotiations, another FARC high commander, 
Iván Márquez, declared that “we are not coca producers neither do 
we have [processing] laboratories nor export [cocaine] or have 
routes, those are the cartels.”99 On the contrary however, the 
FARC’s known narcotraffic activities, the number of fronts 
estimated to be involved in those activities, the Plan Colombia,100 
and the offers made by the armed group to the government during 
the 1999 peace process regarding the substitution of illicit crops, 
all speak otherwise. Further still, the more recent accusations of 
liaisons between the FARC and Mexican drug dealers, clash 
against what the organization is prepared to accept. 
According to a report of the Defense Ministry of Colombia, by 
2000, there were twenty-three FARC fronts suspected of operating 
in an active way within the country´s coca regions.101 In 2005, the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) revealed that, “[t]he strongest 
FARC presence is in the narrow coca belt that begins in southern 
Nariño and stretches northeast through the Amazon basin and to 
the grasslands of eastern Vichada, accounting for about 69,000 of 
the 86,000 hectares of coca cultivated in 2003.” 102Also according 
to the ICG, in the northern part of Colombia, though primarily 
paramilitary zones, 110 FARC fronts are located in nine of the 
north departments where coca and poppy cultivations occurred.103 
There are reports that establish that by 2004, around sixty-five of 
the 110 fronts104 operate in coca growing areas and trade.105 All 
this data points to the idea that the FARC had an elaborate network 
of coca cultivation fronts, which it controlled throughout the entire 
country.   
 
 99 Will Grant, “Las FARC No Tienen Dinero,” Dice Iván Márquez, El 
Número 2 del Grupo Guerrillero Colombiano, BBC MUNDO (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/12/151216_farc_colombia_conflicto_
ivan_marquez.  
   100   See Bigwood & Coffin, supra note 76. Plan Colombia was an official 
initiative entered into by the US and Colombian governments and signed into 
law in 2000. Its purpose was to combat the drug cartels and the Colombian 
insurgent groups.   
 101 War and Drugs in Colombia, supra note 86, at 9. 
 102 Id.  
 103 Id.  
 104 Id.  
 105 Id. 
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The United States and Colombia’s Plan Colombia partnership 
consisted of both military and monetary aid and was launched to: 
(1) reduce coca cultivation, (2) pursue the end of the Colombian 
armed conflict, and (3) reform the country´s economy.106 Both 
governments have acknowledged that the FARC’s earnings exceed 
what a mere ten to fifteen percent tax would be capable of 
creating.107 For instance, the CIA director in 2001 affirmed that the 
FARC, “earns millions of dollars from taxation and other 
involvement in the drug trade.”108 In the same vein, according to 
some authors, the FARC earn around $500 and $600 million USD 
annually from the illegal drug industry. 109 More cautious, the ICG 
warned in a report that the main sources calculating the FARC´s 
income are military, creating doubts as to their impartiality. Other 
authors also advise that these numbers fluctuate depending on who 
is making the estimate. In any case, the ICG report concluded that 
even being conservative in the numbers, it can be fairly affirmed 
that the FARC earn an average of $100 million USD per year in 
drug related business; an amount that surpasses the organization’s 
annual expenses five-fold.110 The reality that the majority of the 
FARC´s income is derived111 from illicit drug activities further 
supports that the organization’s involvement with the industry goes 
far beyond just a ten to fifteen percent per kilogram tax.  
Another indication that the FARC’s involvement in the illegal 
drug business surpasses the gramaje is its capacity to control the 
illicit crops industry in Colombia. During the 1999 peace talks, the 
FARC presented the government with a proposal to collaborate in 
the substitution of the illicit coca crops for legitimate crops in 
 
 106 Id. at 21. 
 107 See id. at 8. 
 108 Tenet, supra note 24. 
 109 War and Drugs in Colombia, supra note 86, at 19. 
 110 Id. 
 111 En junio de 2017, el Fiscal General de la Nación de Colombia, afirmó 
que se están adelantando investigaciones que apuntan a demostrar que las FARC 
cuenta con un patrimonio de “varios billones en bienes.” See Fiscal asegura que 
las Farc tienen varios billones en bienes, SEMANA (June 5, 2017, 5:11 AM), 
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/farc-tienen--varios-billones-en-bienes-
fiscal-general-nestor-humberto-martinez/527507. 
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Cartagena del Chairá,112  a region in which the guerrilla group 
operated. During the same peace process the FARC negotiated 
control of the demilitarized zone El Caguán, to be used as an area 
where they would not face persecution and could therefore keep 
the peace talks going. During the negotiations however, after the 
FARC began to occupy El Caguán, the production of illicit crops 
in the zone increased significantly. The peace talks of 1999 fell 
through and by the end of the year Colombia was the leading drug 
cultivator in the world and the production levels of the coca leaf 
more than doubled from the previous year.113 
Recently, a lot has been published concerning the FARC´s 
involvement in trafficking cocaine internationally.114 Though there 
are some115 that consider that there is not enough evidence to 
establish the FARC´s participation, or even its capacity to 
participate, in the latest stages of the drug business (i.e. refining 
and trafficking), there are facts that point to the FARC’s 
participation in those stages. The exchange of cocaine for arms 
with other criminal groups is one example of the group’s 
participation in the illegal drug business in the post-production 
stages. FARC alliances with Russian criminal groups116 and 
Mexican drug cartels117 for example, are both relationships 
sustained by the FARC’s trading of cocaine for arms. Some may 
argue that since the exchange is to acquire weapons it is simply the 
continuance of the organization´s rebellion and therefore a support 
 
 112 Propuesta de las FARC-EP a la Audiencia Especial con Representación 
de 21 Países, INDEPAZ (Mar. 10, 1999), http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Propuesta-de-las-Farc-sustituci%C3%B3n-de-
cultivos.pdf.  
   113  Bruce Michael Bagley, Tráfico de Drogas, Violencia Política y Política 
Estadounidenses en Colombia durante la Decáda los Noventa, LA 
GLOBALIZACIÓN Y SUS MANIFESTACIONES EN AMÉRICA DEL NORTE 334 n.2 
(2002). 
    114 See Richard Boucher, U.S. Dep’t of State Spokesman, Statement by 
Spokesman Boucher: Colombian Rebel Connection to Mexican Drug Cartel 
(Nov. 29, 2000). 
    115  See War and Drugs in Colombia, supra note 86.  
    116  Tamara Makarenko, The Crime–Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay 
between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism, 6 GLOBAL CRIME  129, 
132 (Feb. 2004). 
   117    Boucher, supra note 114. 
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of the group’s political motive rather than an implication of a 
criminalization of the organization.  
It is important to note that these dealings at minimum reveal 
that the FARC’s involvement in the drug trade industry goes 
beyond their admission of the gramaje. The exchange of cocaine 
for arms requires at least a relationship with the producer of the 
final product and the national seller and international buyer. The 
FARC are linked to those in stage one–the growers–in three ways: 
(1) The admission of the gramaje in which the FARC 
acknowledges its taxation of those carrying out the first stage of 
cultivation, (2) its negotiations with the government in 1999 where 
it used its power over the production of illicit crops as a 
negotiating chip, and (3) the steady growth of drug crops in FARC 
controlled territories. By exchanging drugs for arms, as the 
Mexican and Russian cases show, the FARC is also linked to those 
in the final stages. Together, these facts speak volumes of the 
FARC’s relationship with the crop production and the latest stages 
of the business.  
The clear relationship links between the FARC and those 
working the first stages and last stages of production raises the 
question of whether the FARC has had connections throughout 
every stage of illicit drug production. Though it is clear that the 
FARC’s relationship goes beyond the accepted gramaje, there is 
still the unanswered question of how far it actually goes. 
Additionally, further evidence of an unanswered relationship 
can be inferred by looking at the three following situations: (1) 
Operación Gato Negro, (2) the accusation against the chief of 
finances of the southern block of the FARC, alias Sonia, and (3) 
the capture of Carlos Gamarra.118  
First, Operación Gato Negro was a military operation 
implemented by the Colombian Army.119 It took place in 2001 in 
the eastern Colombian departments of Vichada and Guainia.120 
This operation produced detailed information obtained directly 
 
 118 See generally Jeremy McDermott, Las Farc y el Narcotráfico: ¿Gemelos 
Siameses?, INSIGHT CRIME (May 26, 2014), 
http://es.insightcrime.org/investigaciones/las-farc-y-narcotrafico-gemelos-
siameses. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
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from FARC documents regarding the production, processing and 
transportation of cocaine by this organization.121 Relationships 
between FARC members and international drug dealers were also 
revealed as result of the operation. For instance, Fernandinho 
Beira-Mar, a Brazilian drug baron, was captured while hiding in 
the harborage of Tomás Medina, alias “Negro Acacio” and then 
leader of the 16th Front of the FARC.122 Acacio was considered a 
baron of narcotraffic; he was the first FARC member requested for 
extradition purposes by the United States in relation to 
narcotraffic.123 According to a 2003 Intelligence Report cited by 
the International Crisis Group, the 16th Front, led by Acacio, 
produced large amounts of cocaine (a capability estimated at 
fifteen to twenty tons per month) “for sale to traffickers with routes 
through Brazil and Suriname to Europe.”124 Several arrest warrants 
and a red corner notice issued by the INTERPOL requested 
Acacio´s capture for different charges, among them, 
narcotrafficking. He was never captured and was ultimately killed 
by the Colombian Army in 2007.125 
Second, alias Sonia was another FARC leader legally 
prosecuted for relations with narcotraffic.126 In 2004, she was 
accused of shipping cocaine to Panama and the United States.127 In 
2005, she was extradited to the latter for exporting cocaine there. 
Two years later a District Court of Washington D.C. found her 
guilty for the processing and exportation of cocaine to the U.S.128  
 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123  La ruta de 'Acacio' la siguieron otros capos, como 'Jhon 40, EL TIEMPO 
(June 10, 2016, 1:58 AM), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-
16616154. 
 124 Latin America Drugs I: Losing the Fight, INT’L CRISIS GRP. (Mar. 4, 
2008), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/25-latin-american-drugs-i-losing-
the-fight.pdf. 
 125 E.U. contra las FARC, SEMANA (Nov. 16, 2002, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/eu-contra-farc/55067-3; Colombian 
military: Key rebel and drug trafficker killed, CNN (Sept. 3, 2007, 8:22 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/09/03/farc.rebel.death/index.html?
iref=nextin. 
 126 McDermott, supra note 118. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
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Third was the case of Carlos Gamarra, an international 
trafficker who had business with the FARC.129 He was arrested in 
April 2004 for “trying to provide material support to a designated 
foreign terrorist organization, attempting to export defense 
weapons without a license, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and 
possession of machine guns.”130 According to the U.S. Department 
of State, Gamarra was buying weapons for the FARC and had 
received a down payment of $92.000 USD, where part of the 
remainder was to be paid by the FARC with cocaine.131   
Aside from the previous examples, thousands of media 
documents speak of the FARC´s deeper involvement with drug 
trafficking. However, some of the sources have not been confirmed 
as concluded through academic studies and their reliability is not 
100 percent supported.132  Thus, for purposes of certitude, we rely 
solely on the result of both military operations and judicial cases to 
affirm that the involvement of the FARC with the drug business 
goes beyond the gramaje.  
Again, the precise scope of the FARC’s involvement is yet to 
be determined. Thus, we argue that the peace process opened a 
great window of opportunity for this to be assessed; especially 
when reconciliation, truth, and historical memory are at stake. 
Unfortunately, it seems the peace negotiators thought otherwise. 
When looking at the wording of Point Four of the Final Agreement 
and the criteria established by the Amnesty Law to determine the 
connectivity of a common crime, it appears the window of 
opportunity to learn the truth may be at risk. Indeed, it leaves the 
sensation that the negotiators agreed that the FARC’s involvement 
in narcotraffic was always related to rebellion and solely for 
 
 129 News Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Man sentenced to 25 years in 
prison for scheme to arm Colombian terror group with 4,000 grenades and 2,000 
firearms (Aug. 9, 2005) (available at 
https://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/Illicit/ICE9aug05.pdf.). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Carolina Castillo Marín & Paola Pérez Díaz, La ‘Narcoguerrilla’ Como 
Noticia: Un Análisis de la Representación de las Relaciones entre Narcotráfico y 
Guerrilla en la Prensa Colombiana (2009), (unpublished thesis, Universidad del 
Rosario) (available at 
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/1624/Portada.pdf?sequ
ence=2). 
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financing purposes. A connection like that to the political crime of 
rebellion paves the way for the group’s amnesty. This decision 
now relies on the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, where we hope 
that the window of opportunity to conduct a thorough investigation 
and a deeper analysis on this matter is seriously considered by the 
prosecutors and the Justices.133 
III. THE POLITICAL CRIME AND THE CONNECTED 
CRIME, FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND 
THE COLOMBIAN VIEWPOINTS. 
A.  Political Crime and Connected Crime 
There is no universal or uniform definition for a political 
crime, because it is a controversial matter and a matter of power.134 
The inception of a political crime, both internationally and 
nationally, was to address matters of security and stability of the 
State in relation to conduct that negated and sought to obliterate 
the State or its government. Thus, the political crime has an     
extra-juridical character;135 it is not purely juridical, it is also 
political.   
This reality of political crime has led legislators and judges 
across the globe to try to conceptualize it with a concrete 
definition. A common ground can be identified among this 
conceptualization, which supposes the identification of two general 
components: a subjective and objective element.136 The subjective 
element comprises the intent or motivation of the actor, which 
must be political. The objective element considers the aim of the 
 
 133 See Rocío Quintero, Three major challenges the Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace in Colombia faces, OPINIO JURIS (July 30, 2019), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/30/three-major-challenges-the-special-
jurisdiction-for-peace-in-colombia-faces/.  
   134    IAN JEFFREY ROSS, THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL CRIME 18 (2003). 
   135   Laura Rocío Espinosa Marcka, A Look At Political Crime, Support The 
Existence Of Dams And Political Prisoners, 20 REV. PRINCIPIA IURIS. 151, 155 
(2013). 
   136  Margalida Capellà, ¿Qué queda del delito político en el Derecho 
Internacional contemporáneo? (Observaciones en los ámbitos de la extradición 
y del asilo), 28 REV. ELECTRÓNICA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 1, 10-43 
(2014). 
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conduct or the particular juridical interest at stake, which has to be 
political. Thus, worldwide, political crimes are those that if 
compared with common crimes would denote a political 
component: a “political motive” or a “political context” or 
“political consequences.”137 
In light of the said political component, either as an objective 
or subjective element, political crimes have been classified in order 
to create a more scientific and juridical typology of the crime, and 
also to be able to objectify their application to real scenarios. Even 
today, the jurisprudence in the Western Hemisphere continues 
following the French classification from the 1800s: the pure 
political crime and the connected political crime.  
1. Pure political crime 
Pure political crime is conduct directed against the State,138 the 
government, or the constitutional and legal system, which does not 
involve elements of a common offense139 because there is no harm 
to civilians, their property or interests.140 
The pure political crime overlaps with the exercise of the right 
of self-determination since it encompasses the right to resist 
tyranny.141 This overlap is one of the reasons why the nature or 
character of the pure political crime is extremely complex.  
In order to achieve objectivity, the pure political crime has 
been categorized into various types: rebellion, sedition, treason, 
and espionage.142 These types of political crimes involve conduct 
in of opposition to the State, system, or government (anti-
systemic)143 irrespective of having a violent or non-violent nature. 
In specific contexts, such as peace processes, the perpetrators of 
 
   137  James J. Kinneally III,  The Political Offense Exception: Is the United 
States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty the Beginning of the 
End?, 2 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 203, 209 (1987). 
   138  See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty 
Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1230 (1962). 
 139 Stuart R. Phillips, The Political offense: exception and terrorism, 15 
DICK. J. INTL.L. 337, 340-42 (1997). 
 140 Capellà, supra note 136, at 8. 
 141 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/80 (Dec. 10, 1948).  
 142 ROSS, supra note 134, at 47-57. 
 143 Id. at 32. 
2020]    UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 27 
 
pure political crimes could be granted allowances such as asylum, 
exemption from extradition, and amnesty. 
2. Connected political crime  
A connected political crime is conduct that involves a complete 
independent common crime committed jointly with a political 
crime. The degree of connection between the political crime and 
the connected crime is the element that determines the potential for 
the application of the allowances mentioned above such as 
amnesty.144  
Despite the efforts to categorize, classify, and identify elements 
of a connected political offense, determining when conduct is a 
connected political crime is not a simple or straightforward 
process.145 Attempts to make this classification throughout history 
have led to three different approaches, which are typically used 
worldwide: the political incidence test of Anglo-American law, the 
political objective test of French law, and the political 
predominance or proportionality test of Swiss law. 
a. The Political Incidence: Test of Anglo-American Law. 
Under this test, a connected political crime is a common crime that 
is incidental to, and formed as part of, political disturbances 
(British Approach).146 Further, political disturbances need to occur 
with the valid intent to change the government or the system and 
the connected crime must directly produce a political effect or 
consequences (United States Approach).147  
b. The Political Objective: Test of French Law. Under this test, 
a connected political crime is a common crime directed against the 
State, government, or system; it is not only a political crime by the 
motivation of the actor or its context, but also by the juridical 
interest that is affected with the conduct.148 The test takes into 
consideration the motivation and the gravity of the means used in 
the commission of the crime.149  
 
    144 Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, War Crimes and the Principles of Non-
Extradition of Political Offenders, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 269, 277-78 (1963). 
 145 Phillips, supra note 139. 
 146 Capellà, supra note 136, at 12. 
 147 Id. at 13. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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c. The Political Predominance or Proportionality: Test of Swiss 
Law. Under this test, a connected political crime is a common 
crime that has a political motivation as a controlling one; there is a 
direct connection between the common crime and the purpose 
pursued by a party to modify the political organization of the State, 
and that political motivation is the predominant factor.150  
The three tests developed by State practice, which are followed 
beyond the jurisdictions that gave birth to them, demonstrate the 
difficulties of identifying a connected political crime when facing 
the reality.  
B.  Political Crimes and Their Connected Crimes under the 
Colombian Legal Framework 
The political crime in Colombia, as such, has been recognized 
from both legislative and case law sources. On one hand, the basis 
for its recognition has been the Constitution and the Criminal Code 
has established its definition and the conduct that falls within this 
category of crimes. On the other hand, case law has created the 
basis for its continued development such as the idea of a connected 
crime to the political crime, and the consequential legal response 
that should be given to these related conducts. 
1. Constitution of 1991 
Colombia’s current Constitution, the Constitution of 1991,151 
recognizes the existence of political crime in Colombia and its 
special treatment. Numerous articles in the Constitution relate to 
political crimes, for example the prohibition of extradition (article 
35), the granting of amnesties and pardons (articles 150.17 and 
201.2), and an exemption from the ban on holding some public 
positions due to the commission of a crime (articles 179.17, 232.3 
and 299).152  
It is useful to consider the context in which the Constitution of 
1991 was written, as political crime itself was a factor. The 
 
 150 Id. at 14. 
   151   CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P]. 
   152  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 35, 150.17, 179.17, 
201.2, 232.3, & 299, available at 
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/index.php/constitucion-politica. 
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Constitution was the product of both the people´s movement, 
known as the Séptima Papeleta, and the peace process with the M-
19. The peace process with the M-19 was the first peace process to 
succeed between the government and a Colombian armed group. 
The peace agreement, signed on March 9, 1990, included as one of 
the points, a constitutional amendment (constituyente).153 The 
Séptima Papeleta was an intellectual’s and union’s proposal 
backed by the student’s movement, which sought to include an 
additional ballot item in the election of 1990 requesting for the 
establishment of a Constitutional Assembly (Asamblea Nacional 
Constituyente) to write a new Constitution.154 When the decision to 
promote an amendment of the Constitution was taken, the public 
had the opportunity to vote for who would sit on the Constitutional 
Assembly. Among those chosen were several former M-19 
members and the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente was 
summoned to draft the new Constitution in 1991.155 As a result, the 
new Constitution was established with transitory provisions that 
guarantee the societal integration of former members of the armed 
group.  
Envisioned within this context, transitory Article 30 gave, 
within the peace process, the power to the National Government to 
grant amnesties and pardons for political and connected crimes.156  
The concept of connected crimes in Colombia was addressed 
again in 2012 when the legislative and the executive branches 
amended the Constitution with the Legislative Act 01 of 2012.157 
This Act, known as the Legal Framework for Peace, added a new 
 
 153 DAVID RAMPF & DIANA CHAVARRO, THE 1991 COLOMBIAN NATIONAL 
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY – TURNING EXCLUSION INTO INCLUSION, OR A VAIN 
ENDEAVOUR? 6 (Inclusive Political Settlements Paper 1. Berlin: Berghof Found. 
2014). 
 154 Séptima Papeleta, LATINNO, https://www.latinno.net/en/case/5180/ (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
    155 Constitutional history of Colombia, CONSTITUTION NET, 
http://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-colombia (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2020). 
   156   CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 30.  
 157 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/implementingLaws.xsp?documentId 
=0B91DFB1D904F555C1257C60004EC36F&action=openDocument&xp_coun
trySelected=CO&xp_topicSelected=GVAL-992BUA&from=state (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2020). 
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transitory provision—Article 67.158 It affirms that genocide and 
crimes against humanity are not to be considered as connected 
crimes. 
The Legal Framework for Peace set the legal framework for the 
peace talks between the FARC and the Colombian government. 
Equipped with legislation allowing special treatment, the 
government was able to negotiate with the guerilla group. These 
negotiations culminated in the “Final Agreement to End the 
Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Permanent Peace,” 
signed on November 24, 2016 in Bogotá, Colombia.159     
The Final Agreement provides three including criteria, and two 
excluding criteria, in determining what is considered a connected 
crime within the context of this peace process.160 It also adds 
“grave war crimes” to the list of crimes that cannot be considered 
connected.161  
2. Colombian Criminal Code  
The current Criminal Code of Colombia refers in Articles 467, 
468, and 469 to three crimes committed against the legal and 
constitutional regime: rebellion, sedition, and riot.162  Specifically, 
Article 467 defines rebellion as the “conduct in which, by the use 
of arms, individuals aim to overthrow the national government or 
to suppress or modify the current constitutional or legal regime.”163 
Neither the current Colombian Criminal Code, nor any 
previous versions, define or even mention connected crimes as a 
specific or recognized category. Nonetheless, historically, in 
specific contexts such as transitional or partial transition from war 
to peace in Colombia, some criteria for its determination has been 
developed.  
 
 158 Id. 
 159 See generally Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a 
Stable and Lasting Peace, Colom.-FARC-EP, art. 1-59, Nov. 24, 2016 (available 
at http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-
armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf). 
 160 See id. at art. 7. 
   161    Id. 
   162    CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN] art. 467-69 (Colom. 2000). 
   163    CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN] art. 467 (Colom. 2000). 
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3. Amnesty Law  
As a result of the Final Agreement, Amnesty Law 1820 was 
issued at the end of 2016.164 Article 2 of the law explains that its 
objective is to regulate the amnesties and pardons that can be given 
for political crimes and connected crimes.165 The Amnesty Law 
also lays out specific criteria for what can and will be considered a 
connected crime.166  
Article 8, entitled “Recognition of the Political Crime,” affirms 
that crimes that are considered political crimes are “those in which 
the State and its current constitutional regime are the target of the 
conduct when they are committed without the pursuit of any 
personal profit.”167 It continues by saying that perpetrators of 
political crimes can still be entitled to amnesties if they have 
committed crimes connected to the political crime. It describes 
these connected conducts as those “specifically related to the 
development of the rebellion and committed in association with the 
armed conflict, as well as conduct intended to facilitate, to support, 
to finance, or to hide the development of the rebellion.” 168  
Article 16, gives a non-exhaustive list of conduct that is 
considered connected crimes to the political crimes: conduct 
related to the illegal use or appropriation of means of 
transportation, communications, weapons, and elections, among 
others.169 Article 16 goes on to establish that if the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace Chamber, which grants amnesties and 
pardons, considers conduct outside of what is listed, then its 
consideration must be guided by the aforementioned criteria and 
always bear in mind the exclusion of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, “grave” war crimes, torture, forced displacement, and 
rape.170  
 
 164 L. 1820, diciembre 30, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
   165    Id. at art. 2. 
   166    Id. 
   167    Id. at art. 8. 
   168    Id. 
   169    L. 1820, diciembre 30, 2016, art. 16, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).  
   170    Id. 
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4. Case Law  
The greatest contribution to the Colombian conceptualization 
of the connected crime comes from case law. Both the Colombian 
Supreme Court of Justice and the Colombian Constitutional Court 
have dealt with the question of what can be considered a political 
connected crime. In the cases related to narcotraffic, each of the 
Courts have had occasion to rule on narcotrafficking regarding 
whether it could be viewed as a connected crime. These 
narcotrafficking decisions still did not establish precedent as to 
whether narcotrafficking is to always, or never, be considered a 
connected crime. Both Courts have made important contributions 
to the conceptualizations of the political crime and the connected 
crime;  the establishment of criteria to determine when a common 
crime may or may not be considered a connected crime; the 
exclusion of specific crimes from the category of connected 
crimes; and specifically, on the analysis of the relation between 
narcotraffic and a political crime.  
5. Conceptualization 
In 1945, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice determined 
that the distinctive element of a political crime was its political and 
social motive, defining it as a “notorious interest of improvement 
of the socio-economic and political conditions in the regime of the 
institutions or in the exercise of the power given by the people to 
the government.”171 According to the Court, this element 
distinguished political crimes from common crimes.172 In the 
absence of political and social motives, criminal conduct is 
perpetrated with “individual aims and egoistic motives.”173  
Identifying the socio-political motives of a crime does not 
mean stifling the punitive power of the State. If conduct goes 
against “public peace and the conditions of the constitutional 
organization,”174 it has to be punished since it is in violation of the 
law. The Court, however, recognized that different domestic 
 
 171 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
septiembre 1, 1945, M.P: D. Sarasty Montenegro, Expediente 1945-412615, 
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.](Colom.). 
   172    Id. 
   173    Id. 
   174    Id. 
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systems globally have given special treatment to the perpetrators of 
these crimes, once legal order was re-established.175 The Court 
mentions the special treatments afforded perpetrators of political 
crimes, which include lesser penalties, exemptions to extradition, 
amnesties, and pardons.176  
Over the next several decades the Court continued to elaborate 
on this definition. The Court maintained the distinctive element 
that is the political motive element and framed it under two 
categories, objective and subjective.177  The Court affirmed that for 
a crime to be political, it has to be objectively political, meaning 
the judicial interests protected with this crime relates to the State 
and the Constitutional or legal regime.178 The Court went on to rule 
that the crime must also have a subjective element that is the 
political motive.179 The former, that is the juridical interests 
protected, are the “State organization” and “the correct functioning 
of the government.”180 The latter, that is the political motive, refers 
to “seek the improvement in the direction of public interests . . . to 
overcome the legitimate government, or change in whole or in part 
the current constitutional or legal regime, or to disturb the specific 
enjoyment of social activities.”181  Finally, the Supreme Court 
affirmed that the identification of these political elements are what 
allow for separate sanctions between political crimes and common 
offenses that are committed within a subversive movement, “such 
as fire, homicide and injuries caused outside combat, and, 
generally, the acts of ferocity and barbarism.”182  
In 1996,183 the Court referred again to the concept of political 
crimes, this time presenting five characteristics of this conduct: (1) 
 
   175    Id. 
   176    Id. 
   177  Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, abril 25, 1950, M.P: A. Gómez Prada, Expediente 1950-413077, 
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.). 
   178    Id. 
   179    Id. 
   180    Id. 
   181    Id.   
   182    Id. 
   183  Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, agosto 20, 1950, M.P: Carlos Eduardo Mejía Escobar, Expediente 
1996-11439, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).  
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it always involves an attack against the institutional and political 
organization of the State; (2) it is committed to pursue the 
maximization of social transcendence and political impact; (3) it is 
committed by a real or apparent representation of a social or 
political group; (4) it is inspired in social, political, and 
philosophical principles that can be determined; and (5) it is 
committed with real or apparent aims of socio-political 
vindication. 
Finally, in 2007,184 the Supreme Court synthesized the concept 
of political and connected crimes from a theoretical perspective. 
The approach to the connected political crime can be summarized 
in three theories according to the characteristic element of the 
crime, in terms of determining its political character: (1) objective 
theory, where the characteristic element is that the juridical 
interests protected are the State organization and the right 
functioning of the government; (2) subjective theory, where the 
characteristic element is the political motive; and (3) the eclectic 
theory, where both the objective and subjective elements are 
present in a  political crime.185 
The Constitutional Court has dealt in different decisions with 
the concept of the political crime. In decision C-009 of 1995, the 
Court defined the political crime, as a crime “inspired in an ideal 
of justice,”186 that leads its authors and participants to commit acts 
prescribed in the constitutional and legal order, “as a means to an 
end.” Next, the Court considered that there should be different 
legal treatment for those who committed a crime motivated by the 
common well, as oppose to those who act with egoistic and 
perverse motives.187 Finally, the Court delineated the concept of 
conduct considered as political crimes under the Criminal Code.188  
 
   184  Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, diciembre 5, 2007, M.P: M. del Rosario González de Lemos, 
Expediente 1996-25931, (Colom.).  
   185    Id. 
    186 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 17, 1995, 
Sentencia C-009/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.], (Expediente 
No. D-630) (Colom.).  
   187    Id. 
   188    Id. 
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6. Criteria applied by the Colombian Courts to determine a 
connected crime. 
In 1963, the Supreme Court developed what can be called the 
“strict relationship test,” which gave criteria to determine the 
degree of connection of a common crime to a political crime.189 
According to this test, a common crime comes into the political 
sphere “when one of the crimes cannot be explained without the 
existence of the other,” and the essential motive is political.190 The 
Court continues its explanation by stating that the degree of 
connection is apparent when the harm to the juridical interest of 
the political crime is linked with the political motive underlying 
the commission of the common crime.191   
Additionally, the Supreme Court in a decision regarding the 
determination of granting pardon to members of the M-19 for 
committing robbery, came up with another criterion that can be 
called the  “ideological (teleological) connectivity test.”192 Starting 
from the subjective theory of the political crime, the Supreme 
Court of Justice names "the ideological connection" between a 
common crime and a political crime, as the determining factor for 
the degree of connection.193 In that case, the Court concluded that 
the ideological connection was the factor to determine that the 
robbery was a "means to obtain economic resources for the 
rebellion.”194 Thus, this is a teleological connection that the Court 
referred as “ideological” due to the relation with  rebel conduct.  
In 1993, without establishing a test, the Constitutional Court 
clarified that in determining the degree of connection of a common 
crime to a political crime, the connection does not depend on the 
crime itself but on the characteristics of the specific criminal 
 
 189 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, diciembre 13, 1963, M.P: Humberto Barrera Domínguez, Expediente 
1963-404438, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.). 
   190    Id.  
    191 Id. 
 192 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, mayo 6, 1987, M.P: Jorge Carreño Luengas, Expediente 1986-
406567, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id.   
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conduct.195 For instance, the Court explained that when a homicide 
is committed outside of combat, taking advantage of the 
defenseless situation of the victim, there can be no connection 
between the crime of homicide and the political crime.196   
In 2002, the same Court created the “reasonable and 
proportionality/equality” test, which explained that there is 
criminal conduct that can be subsumed, reasonable and 
proportionate, within the political crimes.197 The Court used 
interchangeably the words proportionality and equality when 
referring to the criteria, but explained the latter in terms of the 
power of the legislator of including or excluding conduct to be 
benefited by an amnesty or pardon.198 When doing so, the 
legislator is prevented by the Court from doing it in an unjustified, 
differentiated way.  Regarding reasonability, the Court referred to 
not making arbitrary decisions that failed to take into account the 
nature of the conduct to be considered as a connected crime or as a 
subsumed crime within a political crime.199 The Court failed, 
however, to give factors that help  limit each of the concepts of the 
test.  
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Justice established another 
criterion derived from the classification of conduct as political 
crime. Connected crimes are the ones that are closely intertwined 
as a means to an end (teleological connectivity); as a means to 
assure the product of other criminal conduct (paratractic 
connectivity);200 or as a means to hide a previous crime 
(“hipotática” (subordinate) connectivity).201  Thus, the central 
 
 195 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], junio 9, 1993, 
Sentencia C-214/93, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente 
R.E.-041) (Colom.). 
   196    Id.  
   197 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2002, 
Sentencia C-695/02, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente D-
3945) (Colom.). 
   198    Id. 
   199    Id. 
    200 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, diciembre 5, 2007, M.P: M.del Rosario González, Expediente 2007-
415134, (Colom.).  
 201 See also Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. 
Pen. Sentencia, noviembre 24, 2010, M.P: M. del Rosario González de Lemos, 
Expediente 2010-34482, (Colom.).  
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factor in determining whether conduct is a connected crime is the 
closely intertwined relationship between the two crimes and 
whether the common crime was in fact a means to accomplish 
something related to the political crime. 
7. Excluding Specific Crimes 
When excluding specific crimes from the category of a 
connected crime, the Constitutional Court has noted the atrocious 
character of certain crimes. The Court has affirmed that any 
conduct committed in an atrocious way without respect for human 
dignity must be excluded from the category of connected crimes.202   
In this sense, the Court has expressly excluded certain conducts 
as political offences. First, homicide only when it is committed 
during combat and the aggressor took advantage of the victim’s 
defenseless situation. 203 Second,  kidnapping is considered by the 
Court as atrocious due to the defenseless state in which the victim 
is placed, the social instability that it causes, and the various 
fundamental rights that are violated by this crime.204 Third, 
terrorism, that as analyzed by the Court, the international 
community has unanimous and repeatedly recognized as an 
atrocious crime.205 Fourth,  enforced disappearance of persons was 
 
 202 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], junio 9, 1993, 
Sentencia C-214/93, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente 
R.E.-041) (Colom.). 
 203 Id. 
 204 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 23, 1994, 
Sentencia C-069/94, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente 
No.  D-388 Y D-401) (Colom.). 
 205 See Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 11, 
2003, Sentencia C-127/93, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] 
(Expediente LAT-237) (Colom.); Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional 
Court], mayo 28, 2008, Sentencia C-537/08, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional 
[G.C.C.] (Expediente LAT-300) (Colom.). 
The Constitutional Court in Decision C-037 of 2004, analyzed the 
constitutionality of the law through which Colombia domestically approves the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
Article 14 of this Convention states that: “None of the offences set forth in 
article 2 shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal 
assistance as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political 
offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for 
extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be 
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refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence 
connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.” 
The crimes referred in Article 2 are the following: 
“Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, 
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”; “Unlawfully, by force or 
threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seize or exercise control of, 
(an) aircraft, or attempt to perform any such act”;Unlawful acts against the 
safety of civil aviation, according to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 
September 1971, and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988; 
A murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an 
internationally protected person; A violent attack upon the official premises, the 
private accommodation or the means of transport of an internationally protected 
person likely to endanger his person or liberty; threat to commit any such attack; 
An attempt to commit any such attack; and act constituting participation as an 
accomplice in any such attack shall be made by each State Party a crime under 
its internal law; 
“Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to 
continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in 
order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international 
intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of 
persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition 
for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages 
("hostage-taking") … ”; 
Any unlawful taking of nuclear material, according to the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980; 
Any unlawful act against the safety of maritime navigation according to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; 
Any unlawful act against the safety of  fixed platforms located on the 
Continental Shelf, according to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, 
done at Rome on 10 March 1988; 
“Unlawfully and intentionally deliver, place, discharge or detonate an 
explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State 
or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure 
facility 
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
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excluded as a political crime (and thus, as a connected crime) when 
the Court studied the institution towards the extradition 
consequence.206  Fifth, though not expressly mentioning the crime 
of extortion, in 1993, the Court made a wider list of atrocious 
conduct in which extortion might be included given the context of 
“narco-terrorism.”207  In the concurring opinion of decision C-095 
of 2002, three Justices affirmed that, together with terrorism and 
kidnapping, the crime of extortion is an atrocious crime that cannot 
be included within the concept of political crimes and connected 
crimes.208 Sixth, the conduct that is a result of “narco-terrorism”, 
such as massacres, kidnapping, systematic murders and the use of 
explosives against the civilian population, fall into the category of 
crimes against humanity, and thus, will never be considered as 
political crimes.209 Four years later, in decision C-456 of 1997, the 
Court expressly excluded from the category of connected crimes, 
crimes against humanity and all other crimes that are ferocious 
and barbaric, as those international crimes.210 
In conclusion, though over the years the Constitutional Court 
has excluded specific crimes from falling under the category, the 
Court has not named crimes that are to be considered, across the 
board, as connected to political crimes. The Tribunal recognizes 
that this is a legislative task of the Congress. Its exclusions, 
 
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility 
or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major 
economic loss.” 
The Constitutional Court found the law and the treaty in agreement with the 
Constitution. Therefore, in Colombia, those crimes can not be considered neither 
political crimes, nor connected crimes to the former. 
 206 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 31, 2002, 
Sentencia C-580-02, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente 
L.A.T.-218) (Colom.). 
 207 Id. 
 208 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2002, 
Sentencia C-695/02, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente D-
3945) (Colom.). 
 209 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 5, 1993, 
Sentencia C-171/93, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (R.E. 034) 
(Colom.). 
 210 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 23, 1997, 
Sentencia C-456/97, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente 
No. D-1615) (Colom.). 
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however, come from the recognition of the consequences of 
affording certain benefits such as amnesty, pardon, and exemption 
from extradition.  
Without articulating an exhaustive list, the Supreme Court of 
Justice has declared some specific conduct as connected crime. Its 
decisions have been based on the “means to an end” ideology and 
have been passed down on a case-by-case basis studying the 
possible connection of common crimes to the political crimes of 
rebellion and sedition. This has been done in the already 
mentioned terms of finding robbery as a connected crime when 
used “to obtain economic resources for the rebellion.”211 Another 
specific conduct crime has been committed when determining that 
the illegal acquisition of weapons is “a means to its subsequent 
use” by the rebels or seditious. Thus, this conduct was found to be 
a connected crime taking into account that the political crimes of 
rebellion and sedition presuppose the use of weapons.212   
Under the same rationale, the Supreme Court denied connected 
crime status to a homicide committed outside of combat.213 The 
Court found that the conduct lacked a political and altruistic 
motive and ruled that “from a political point of view, in a 
revolutionary sense, the conduct was useless,” and thus, did not 
share the political connection required to the political crime.214 The 
same reasoning lead the Court’s decision in 2003, when it found 
lack of a political motive, together with an inconsistency between 
the juridical interests affected by the alleged connected crime and 
the political crime.215 In that decision, the Court affirmed that 
 
 211 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, mayo 6, 1986, M.P: J.Carreño Luengas, Expediente 1986-406567, 
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).  
 212 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, mayo 27, 1986, M.P: L.Martínez Zuñiga, Expediente 1986-406579, 
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme 
Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. Sentencia, junio 4, 1986, M.P: H. Baquero Borda, 
Expediente 1986-406583, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).  
 213 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Interlocutorio, agosto 20, 1996, M.P: C. Eduardo Mejía Escobar, Expediente 
1996-409438, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.], (Colom.). 
 214 Id.  
 215 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Interlocutorio, septiembre 10, 2003, M.P: Á. Orlando Pérez Pinzón, Expediente 
2003-390055, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.). 
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conspiracy to commit a crime cannot be considered as a connected 
crime, since not only are its motives selfish and individualistic (as 
opposed to the altruistic, generous, and collectively-oriented 
motives common in political crimes), but the juridical interests 
affected (public safety) do not correspond to the interests attacked 
by the political crime (constitutional and legal regime).216   
8. Narcotrafficking 
Specifically regarding crimes related to narcotrafficking, both 
Courts have had the opportunity to deal with decisions related to 
political crimes, connected crimes and narcotrafficking.  
The Constitutional Court has never expressly given or denied 
criminal activities related to narcotrafficking the character of a 
politically connected crime. Some approximations and indirect 
references, however, have been made.  
The clearest rejection of narcotrafficking as a connected crime 
came in 1993. In decision C-171, during a scheduled constitutional 
review of Decree 264 the Court affirmed that common criminality 
cannot be confused with political criminality.217 In making this 
point, the Court pointed to the violence produced from 
narcotrafficking as an example. In its words: 
The aim pursued by organized crime, particularly 
through narco-terrorist violence, consists of putting 
civil society in a defenseless position, when 
threatening with irreparable harm, if they oppose 
their ideals . . . . The atrocious acts committed by 
narco-terrorism     . . . constitute crimes against 
humanity, that could never be covered up with the 
mantle of a political crime.218  
 
 216 Id.  
 217 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 5, 1993, 
Sentencia C-171/93, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.], (Colom.). 
   218   See id. (Following the same path, in 2006, the Vice-Minister of Justice 
and Interior of Colombia, affirmed that it should be taken into account that the 
legislator has expressly denied the connection between sedition and genocide, 
crimes against humanity or narco-traffick, in his official opinion requested by 
the Constitutional Court. This was considered within the specific context of the 
demobilization and the special jurisdiction for the paramilitary groups); see also 
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Within the context of the FARC, the 2013 Decision C-579 
assesses the constitutionality of the Legal Framework for Peace. In 
doing so, the Constitutional Court’s decision refers to 
narcotrafficking alongside conduct that it has already determined 
will be prosecuted by the Special Jurisdiction—genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. This introduces doubt as to the 
validity of the apparent silent decision taken by the negotiators to 
grant narcotrafficking connected crime status.  
Regarding the Supreme Court of Justice, the reference to the 
narcotraffic activities in relation to political crime, has been 
analyzed mainly in the context of requests for extradition. The 
decisions have been related to one of two scenarios: first, when the 
required person is not a member of an illegal armed group, and 
second, when the person belongs to one of these groups, namely, 
the FARC or the paramilitaries. The distinction between these two 
groups is important because, the Colombian judicial system has 
recognized the FARC’s ability to commit political crimes as 
opposed to the paramilitary groups, which it expressly stated, 
committed common, not political, crimes.219   
In the second scenario, the Supreme Court has ruled on 
whether FARC members would be extradited for narcotrafficking 
or whether they could be exempted from extradition by calling the 
narcotraffic a connected crime and extending it the same special 
treatments as a political crime.220  
When FARC members have been requested for extradition, the 
Court has responded in two different ways. In 2004, the Court 
affirmed that narcotraffic related conduct perpetrated by FARC 
members can be considered connected with the political crime of 
 
Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo, 18, 2006, C-370/06, 
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.], (Colom.).  
   219  Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Pen. M.P: Y. 
Ramírez Bastidas, Radicado 26949, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.], (Colom.). (stating 
that during the peace process with the paramilitary groups, the Congress issued 
Law 975 of 2005. Article 71 of Law 975, defined sedition as a political crime, 
amending article 468 of the Criminal Code by indicating that members of 
guerrilla or paramilitary groups also commit this crime if their “conduct 
interferes in the normal functioning of the constitutional and legal order.” L. 
975, art. 71, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
   220   Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Pen. M.P: Y. 
Ramírez Bastidas, Radicado 26949, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.], (Colom.). 
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rebellion when the narcotrafficking facilitated the execution of the 
political crime.221 The Court went on to affirm, however, that 
activities related to narcotrafficking may still warrant extradition 
even when considered as a connected crime—that is, the connected 
crime status does not automatically give the perpetrators an 
exemption from extradition.222 In that case, the Court affirmed that 
the FARC perpetrator of narcotrafficking would not be exempted 
and as result, the request for extradition was granted and alias 
Simón Trinidad was extradited to the United States.223 The Court 
based its decision on the fact that Congress has not established that 
narcotrafficking activities are per se connected crimes, and that 
“the international community denies narcotrafficking this 
characteristic,” explained in Article 3.10 of the UN Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988.224   
The Supreme Court opined on the FARC’s narcotrafficking 
activity again in 2015 this time concluding that it did not constitute 
a connected crime.225 In the decision, which was also based on the 
UN Convention of 1988, the Court maintained that connected 
crime status, even if granted, cannot be an obstacle for extradition 
purposes.226  In the 2015 case, the circumstances in which the 
narcotrafficking activities occurred were: the coordination of the 
“Tenth Front's narcotics trafficking activities (of the FARC), 
including the purchase, manufacture and transportation of cocaine 
and cocaine base.”227 This means that the Court considered that 
even in this specific context (FARC narcotraffic related activities), 
those criminal activities are prevented from being considered as a 
connected crime for the purposes of the UN Convention of 1988, 
 
 221 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Concepto de Extradición, noviembre 27, 2004, M.P: S. Espinosa Pérez, 
Expediente 2004-22450, (Colom.). 
   222    Id. 
    223 Id. 
 224 Id.   
 225 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Concepto de Extradición, Sept. 2015, M.P: Eugenio Fernández Carlier, CP 117-
2015 (Colom.). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id.  
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which includes not only extradition (article 6) but also 
investigation and prosecution (article 7).  
As per the paramilitary’s requests, the Court arrived at the 
same conclusion of not preventing extradition for narcotraffic 
related activities based on the absence of definition by the 
Congress of a list of crimes that can be considered as connected to 
the political crimes and the “denial of this character (narcotraffic as 
a connected crime) by the international community”, as established 
in the UN Convention of 1988.228  
Worthy of noticing is decision No. 24187, in which the Court 
in the context of extradition, affirmed, “there is no way in which 
narcotrafficking can have a connection with sedition as a political 
crime.” The Court based this last affirmation in the two arguments 
already mentioned and used in previous decisions.229 
In conclusion, we can affirm that the Supreme Court of Justice 
considers that in principle, narcotrafficking activities are neither 
political crimes nor connected crimes, when there is no rebellion or 
sedition context. However, we can also affirm that the Court has 
not been conclusive with respect to this classification given the 
rebellion or sedition context. Noteworthy also, is that the Court did 
not find a difference when analyzing and concluding the degree of 
connection of narcotrafficking activities on the part of the FARC 
(capable of political crime), with that of the paramilitaries 
(incapable of political crime).230  
Finally, it should be highlighted that the Supreme Court´s case 
law seems to ignore the fact that the UN Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 
does not make a difference or exception relying on a given context 
(for example, financing or supporting a rebellion) when it denies 
the character of connected crime to narcotrafficking related 
 
 228 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Concepto de Extradición, diciembre 2007, M.P: S. Espinosa Pérez, 28505, 
(Colom.).  
 229 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Concepto de Extradición, septiembre 26, 2007, M.P: J. Enrique Socha 
Salamanca, 24187, (Colom.).  
 230 This might have changed after the Constitutional Court´s decision 
declaring inconstitutional Article 71 of the Law of Justice and Peace. This 
article proposes the possibility to consider that paramilitarism in Colombia 
consisted in the crime of sedition. 
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activities. The Convention only refers to the purposes in which this 
prohibition applies, that is, not only extradition but also mandatory 
investigation and prosecution. Thus, based on this Convention, 
there is no reason to conclude that the international rule (of no 
exception to the prohibition of categorizing crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes as connected crimes to 
political crimes) is not applicable or extended to narcotrafficking.  
IV. DETERMINATION OF FARC´S 
NARCOTTRAFICKING ACTIVITIES AS A 
CONNECTED CRIME TO REBELLION  
In order to determine if there is a connection between the 
FARC’s political crimes and their involvement with 
narcotrafficking, the universal tests as well as Colombia’s 
principles should be applied to the facts. Before this application 
however, it is important to understand where Colombia currently 
stands politically in order to have a context with which to assess 
the results of the analysis.  
Point Four of the Final Agreement that ended the peace 
negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government is 
officially titled, “The Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs.”231 
As optimistic as that title is, it seems from the terms the two groups 
finally agreed to that their aim became more realistic throughout 
the process.   
In arriving at the Final Agreement, the Mesa de Negociaciones 
(Negotiation Table) began the discussions around this goal of 
ending the illicit drug industry, back in November 2013.232 
Different proposals were at the table, specifically those coming 
from two celebrated national forums, one in Bogotá and the other 
in San José del Guaviare (a zone notorious for its involvement in 
the cocaine trade).233 The two forums took place two months 
before the negotiations in Havana with the participation of the civil 
 
 231 Colombian Government and FARC Joint Release, Comunicado Conjunto 
No. 34: Acuerdo sobre “Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas” 
[Agreement on the “Solution to the Illicit Drug Problem”] mayo 17, 2014, 
available at http://www.humanas.org.co/archivos/comunicadoconjunto34.pdf. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
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society, among them peasants and cultivators of poppy and of 
other base elements for the production of illicit drugs.234 Moreover, 
4,000 proposals came from the Mesas Regionales (similar to a 
town hall meetings) summoned by the Peace Commissions of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives of the Colombian 
Congress.235 On May 17, 2014, the government and the FARC 
issued Joint Release Number 34, informing the public that they had 
reached an agreement on the fourth point of the agenda.236 
The result of the discussions culminated in a commitment by 
the Colombian government to establish a criminal policy strategy. 
This policy has three prongs, all aligned with the aspirations 
expressed by both parties in the agreement, that is, to have “a 
country without narcotraffic.”237 The first prong identifies the war 
against corruption; the second one discusses the investigation, 
prosecution, and judgment of crimes carried out by any criminal 
organization and related to the production and trade of illicit 
drugs.238 Finally, the third prong addresses a strategy against 
laundering of assets and assets that in general are involved with 
narcotraffic.239  
The FARC´s commitment is to contribute in an effective way 
to the solution of this problem.  The agreement’s careful wording 
stated, “within the context of ending the conflict, (the FARC) will 
end any relationship with the drug trafficking phenomenon that 
had operated as a function of the rebellion.240” From these words, 
it seems apparent that the government and the FARC have agreed 
that the guerilla group’s involvement in narcotrafficking was 
within the frame of rebellion. Thus, it seems to have already been 
quietly decided by the government that the FARC’s 
 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id.  
 237 Final Accord, Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la 
Construcción de una Paz y Estable y Duradera [Final Accord for the End of 
Conflict and the Construcion of a Stable and Lasting Peace], Nov. 24, 2016, 
available at http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y 
conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-
2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf. 
 238  Id. 
   239    Id. 
   240    Id. 
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narcotrafficking is considered a connected crime to their political 
crime of rebellion.  
Nonetheless, a clear policy in regard to narcotraffic within the 
context of the transition to justice and peace in Colombia remains 
to be publicly recognized. Whether narcotraffic can be considered 
as a connected political crime cannot be an exclusive matter of 
politics but must also be a matter of law. Therefore, in answering 
the legal question presented in this article, we apply the various 
legal tests to this particular common crime committed by the 
FARC–narcotrafficking–to see if it can fall under connected crime 
status.  
A.  A Determination of FARC´s narcottraficking activities as a 
connected crime to rebellion is in Conformity with the Universally 
Accepted Tests241  
1. Political Incident Test (Anglo-American):  
This test supposes that conduct qualified as “politically 
connected” is conduct that occurs within the context of a political 
incident or an uprising.  It should be part of the political incident or 
uprising and should be committed with the intent to derive political 
consequences. 
 The political incident in Colombia is the domestic, armed 
conflict in which the FARC and the government (among other 
actors) were immersed for more than five decades. The FARC got 
involved in this conflict with the intent to overthrow the 
government, and thus rebellion is the political incident they have 
been charged with.  
Considering this is such a long incident (spanning several 
decades), in order to conclude whether the FARC’s 
narcotrafficking could be connected to their crime of rebellion, 
their involvement needs to be qualified through the historical 
context of the group, as its dynamics changed several times during 
the fifty years of armed conflict. 
 
 241 The Seventh Phase of FARC´s history is not analyzed in this article due 
to the disparity on the sources and lack of possibility to verify the information 
found during the research process.  
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As explained in Section I, during the five or more decades of 
the FARC´s war, its ideology, military strategy, and policies 
changed over time. It is widely accepted that during the “rebound 
and boom” phase of the 1980s, the FARC´s gramaje was a strategy 
within the context of their rebellion used to finance the military 
campaign. Thus, at that point, under the political incident test, the 
FARC’s ties to narcotrafficking could qualify as a connected 
crime.  
During the phase of “deterioration and de-legitimization,” the 
FARC´s activities in narcotraffic are not as clear. In addition to the 
gramaje, which was maintained, the FARC´s activities into the 
drug business during this period are known to have progressed. 
Throughout this phase the FARC’s military campaign continued to 
escalate, this required more resources in personnel, finances, and 
infrastructure. These facts support the reports that estimate an 
increase in the FARC’s involvement with narcotrafficking in the 
1990s. Different organizations have calculated that taxing the coca 
growers and the buyers, along with the FARC’s other practices of 
kidnapping and extortion, combined could not have been sufficient 
to account for their military growth during this phase. Because this 
increase in involvement is thought to have been to increase their 
military capacity, it can be argued that in its fourth phase, the 
FARC’s narcotrafficking activities were still committed to finance 
their rebellion, and thus, with the intent to derive political 
consequences. 
The FARC’s activities during phases five and six, however 
seem to point to an abandonment of their military objective. 
During the fifth phase of “reorganization and redirection,” the 
FARC had already grown enough to sustain forty-eight fronts, 
control thirty-seven percent of the country’s small towns, 
urbanized the conflict, and escalate the military campaign, all 
while fighting a severely weakened government inundated by the 
narcotraffic epidemic. Despite the vulnerability of the government 
and its own surge in power, the FARC did not advance on its 
objective to overthrow the government.  
During this period Colombia was a nation plagued by an illegal 
drug epidemic that was at its peak. The crime rates were at an all-
time high, there was political and social instability with a society 
frightened by the level of violence, and a government failing at 
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trying to control the problem. In the midst of this, the FARC had 
become economically and militarily autonomous. Thus, having all 
the circumstances present to achieve the organization´s military 
objective of overthrowing the government, the fact that the FARC 
did not seriously pursue that goal points to the conclusion that the 
group had lost sight of the rebellion. Therefore, under the political 
incident test, during the fifth and sixth phases of its development, 
from 1993-2002, the FARC’s activity in narcotrafficking would 
not be considered a connected crime to the political crime of 
rebellion, because their narcotraffic activities were not carried out 
to finance the rebellion but rather to grow their business. 
In conclusion, by using the incident test to look at the context 
and the intent, the FARC’s involvement in narcotrafficking having 
evolved from financing a rebellion during the third phase to 
turning a profit during the fourth and fifth phase. Therefore, the 
fourth phase cannot be qualified as a connected crime, because it 
ceased to be part of the incident and was not committed with a 
political motive.   
2. Political Objective Test (French):  
This test supposes that a connected crime involves conduct that 
has a political component, and that the means used to carry it out 
do not outweigh the seriousness of the crime committed.  
Let us remember that the political component is the aim or 
motive, the context, or the sought consequences. In the studied 
case, the political component depends on the phase in which 
FARC activities took place. During the three initial phases, the 
motive might have been the defining political component. 
However, in the subsequent phases (fourth through sixth), neither 
the political motive nor the desired political consequences were 
present in the FARC´s narcotraffic activities. Finally, even if one 
argues that the political context existed, the seriousness of the 
offense outweighs the crime committed.  
Although core crimes of international law have primarily been 
considered when assessing the seriousness of a crime for 
application of the French test, grave violations of human rights are 
not limited to these core crimes. The Preamble of the Rome Statute 
recognizes that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and aggression are the most serious crimes. This means that there 
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are other crimes that are serious apart from those related to grave 
violations of human rights. In the same vein, the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime establishes a broad 
definition of serious crimes under Article 2.242 This definition 
describes in terms of the amount of penalty, more specifically in 
the number of years of deprivation of liberty as a result of the 
commission of the crime. The number of years for trafficking, 
production, or possession of drugs, established under article 376 of 
the Criminal Code of Colombia, exceeds these number of years. 
Even though the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime does not explicitly include narcotraffic activities, or any 
specific crime, as a serious crime, the travaux preparatoires show 
that, during negotiations, the different proposed lists of crimes 
considered as serious crimes always include the trafficking in 
drugs.   
Moreover, this crime is so serious that an analysis of conduct 
constituting crimes against humanity committed by FARC might 
lead to the conclusion that narcotraffic perpetrated by this group 
constitutes the “organizational policy to commit” the attack 
directed against the civilian population.243  For instance, an 
example of this might be the enforced displacement of the civil 
population in order to guarantee the control over the drug routes. 
Finally, narcotrafficking is a transnational criminal activity that 
goes against the “health and welfare of human beings,” that 
“threatens stability, security and sovereignty of States,” that 
“penetrate[s] [and] . . . corrupt[s] structures of government” and 
society at all its levels,244 as was recognized by Colombia when 
signing and ratifying the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.  Thus, 
narcotrafficking could be considered a serious international crime. 
 
 242 G.A. Res. 25/55, United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 4 (Jan. 8, 2001).  
 243 I.C.C. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INTERIM REPORT OF THE SITUATION 




   244   ECOSOC, United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, (Dec. 19, 1998), Preamble, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/49997af90.html.  
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Therefore, when applying the proposed approach by the 
political objective test, narcotrafficking by the FARC in Colombia 
could not be considered as a political connected crime due to the 
fact that drug trafficking has a degree of seriousness that, although 
not necessarily comparable to the already accepted standards of 
barbarity and atrocity, supports the probable conclusion.  
While the level of seriousness of narcotrafficking is still under 
discussion, factors such as the severe social instability it has 
caused in the Colombian society,245 the juridical interests it affects, 
and the importance the international community246 has placed on 
fighting this crime, all tip the balance in favor of the seriousness of 
the crime excluding it from connected crime status. Under this 
theory, despite having a political component during the three initial 
phases, the seriousness of the crime of narcotrafficking during 
every phase of the organization’s history (first through sixth), 
outweighs the benefit of connecting it to their political crime.  
3. Predominance or proportionality Test (Swiss):  
This test supposes that when the political motivation is the 
most important aspect of the conduct, which supposes that the 
connection between the pure political crime and the common crime 
is strong, it can be said that the common crime is strictly necessary 
to achieve the political crime. Thus, there is a proportionality of 
the common crime to the goal of the pure political crime–an 
element that makes this test a restrictive approach on how to 
qualify a connected crime.  
Generally speaking, the principle of proportionality is used 
when assessing a norm that might violate fundamental rights. This 
is the reason why courts such as the Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights have largely developed this principle. According to 
this Court´s case law, the proportionality test is composed by three 
prongs: (i) the necessity, requiring that the method used to restrict 
a fundamental right was the most benign, or, in general terms, that 
the end could not have been reached in a different way that caused 
 
 245 See Sentencia C-069/94, supra note 204 (referencing that The 
Constitutional Court of Colombia said that kidnapping is an atrocious crime due 
to the social instability caused to the society, among other reasons, and it could 
not be considered a political crime.).  
 246 G.A. Res. 17/8, (Feb. 23, 1990). 
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less suffering to the individual; (ii) the suitability, requiring that 
the means used to make the restriction be the most adequate to the 
factual possibilities according to the end that is pursued; and (iii) 
the proportionality, requiring the weighing the rights at stake.  
Now, in terms of political crimes and the determination of the 
connected crimes, the proportionality test has also been used, this 
time not necessarily in relation to fundamental rights, but to the 
juridical interests protected by denominating conduct as a common 
crime or a political crime.  The proportionality test, as envisioned 
by the Swiss, encompasses three prongs: (i) that the common crime 
was committed within the framework of the political objective; (ii) 
that the common crime had effectively contributed to achieve the 
political objective; and (iii) that the commission of the common 
crime was indispensable and necessary to achieve the political 
objective.  
Regarding the first two prongs, as we will later elucidate, the 
argument about narcotrafficking within the framework of the 
political objective and its contribution to the achievement of this 
political objective, existed during the three first phases of FARC. 
Thus, necessity is the prong to be analyzed.  
In the context of FARC´s activities related to narcotraffic, 
during the initial phases of the organization, the gramaje could be 
considered a non-excessive means in the Colombian armed 
conflict. However, serving as a gateway between production and 
distribution to contribute with the “drugalization” of the society 
and the proliferation of violence in Colombia suggest that the 
gramaje could actually be considered an excessive means to 
finance the crime of rebellion. This is not to say that the gramaje 
was not used to finance the rebellion, but it was not necessary 
since there were other sources of income that the organization 
could have pursued or at least explored during its origins, such as 
looking for additional funding from its international and national 
supporters. 
The other argument is viable as well, in terms that the gramaje 
was necessary to finance the military strategy and to expand and 
conquer other territories in the country. Nevertheless, we affirm 
that the balance inclines towards the lack of necessity of 
narcotrafficking activities since the gramaje was not indispensable 
to reach their goal. The organization could have pursued its 
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funding objective, for example, through the exploitation of natural 
resources as many other armed groups have done.247  In that case, 
the political component would be more evident, as the link with the 
political motive is directly connected with the interest harmed by 
the conduct committed, due to the fact that it continues to affect 
the State´s juridical interest and still furthers the political objective.  
The application of the predominant test to FARC’s drug 
activities during the initial phases, when it emerged and started 
growing, furthers the assertion that those could not be qualified as 
common crimes connected to the political crime of rebellion, since 
at least one of the prongs was not met because FARC´s drug 
activities were excessive and not indispensable means.   
Nevertheless, while looking to FARC’s narcotrafficking 
activities the beginning of the 1990´s, during the subsequent 
phases of the organization, we can conclude that narcotrafficking 
does not meet any of the three prongs of the proportionality test. 
FARC’s activities that guide this conclusion are: (1) FARC´s 
presence in a great number of municipalities where the coca was 
produced, (2) FARC´s control over the price and the merchants 
involved in the local trade of coca and cocaine, (3) FARC´s 
monopoly of the market in certain areas of Colombia to the point 
that they were in a position to trade arms for drugs internally and 
internationally. 
FARC’s narcotrafficking activities, as described above, go 
beyond the framework of the political objective due to the fact that 
the predominant motivation was economic profit and not the 
overthrowing of the government. The billions of dollars acquired 
from the business, even in the most conservative calculation, 
exceeds the operational cost of the organization. Additionally, even 
though those billions of dollars have contributed to advance their 
military tactics, it has not guided the achievement of the political 
objective. When the best possible circumstances were present to 
achieve the political objective, FARC did not pursue the path to 
execute the military strategy and continued pursuing profits and 
their market participation in the drug business. Lastly, affecting the 
public health of the Colombian society and the world (the juridical 
 
 247 See Ursula Daxecker & Brandon C. Prins, Financing rebellion, 54 J. 
PEACE RES. 215, 216-18 (Jan. 1, 2017). 
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interest protected under the crime of narcotraffic) is not the 
ultimate consideration, meaning is not necessary or is an excessive 
means, because it could have pursued other, less harmful, means of 
financing. For example, they could have pursued the financial 
support of the Colombian nationals, as they claim to be the “army 
of the people” (FARC-EP). Thus, the application of the Swiss test 
to the facts, meaning FARC’s activities during the phases four to 
six of the group, persuades the conclusion that narcotrafficking 
could not be a connected crime since none of the three prongs are 
met.  
However, as said before, the lack of clarity regarding FARC´s 
relationship with narcotraffic, does not allow a definite conclusion 
on whether those activities could be a connected crime to the crime 
of rebellion. That is why the discussion about classifying it, a 
priori, as a connected crime to FARC´s rebellion should not 
prevent this relationship. It is essential to disclose FARC’s extent 
of involvement in narcotrafficking during the armed conflict, since 
a “permanent and stable peace” can only be achieved with truth, 
the foundation and guarantee of reconciliation for any society, 
especially in a society like Colombia’s, which has suffered a drug 
epidemic. 
B.  Determination of FARC´s narcotrafficking activities as a 
connected crime to rebellion in Conformity with the Colombian 
Case Law 
The apparent silent decision to consider narcotrafficking as a 
connected crime to rebellion within the context of the peace 
negotiations and the Final Agreement is not necessarily consistent 
with the case law of the two High Courts of Colombia.  In 1963, 
the Supreme Court of Justice opted for the “strict relationship test,” 
thereby applying the Swiss Test.248  The Constitutional Court did 
so as well in 2002 when applying the “reasonable and 
proportionality/equality test.”249 As we explained above, the 
 
 248 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, diciembre 13, 1963, M.P: H. Barrera Domínguez, Expediente 1963-
404438, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.). 
 249 Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2002, 
Sentencia C-695/02, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Expediente D-
3945) (Colom.). 
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conclusion when applying this test is that the narcotraffic activities 
committed by the FARC could not be considered a connected 
crime.  
In 1986 and 2007, the Supreme Court of Justice applied the 
Anglo-American Test when referring the teleological, paratractic, 
and subordinated (hipotáctica) connectivity as a determinative 
factor of the qualification––a means to accomplish the end, the 
product, or the commission of the political crime.250 When 
applying this test to the studied case, narcotraffic can be 
considered a connected crime under the third and fourth phases. 
However, under the fifth phase (1993-1998) and sixth phase (1998-
2002) there is a lack of connection between FARC´s rebellion and 
narcotraffic activities. This allows the inference that according to 
the most recent decision analyzed on this matter by the Supreme 
Court (2007), the applicable test would lead to excluding the 
narcotraffic activities of the FARC as a connected crime, at least 
between 1993 to 2002. 
Finally, both High Courts of Colombia, when excluding a 
specific conduct from qualifying as a connected crime, applied the 
French Test in referring to the atrociousness and barbarism of the 
conduct. In these decisions, the Courts never excluded narcotraffic 
related conduct from the possibility of being considered connected. 
The determination on whether narcotrafficking is of sufficient 
seriousness to be excluded from ever qualifying as a connected 
crime is still under discussion. The fact that neither of the Courts 
has expressly excluded this conduct as a connected crime does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that narcotrafficking is not 
serious enough to be excluded from the connected crime category. 
In this analysis we have argued that narcotrafficking is serious 
enough and that this assertion seems to be backed by the 
international community. 
 
 250 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. 
Sentencia, May 6, 1987, M.P: J. Carreño Luengas, Expediente 1986-406567, 
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme 
Court], Sala. Casa. Pen. Sentencia, Dec. 5, 2007, M.P: M. del Rosario González, 
Expediente 2007-415134, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.).  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The peace talks in Havana designed to bring about a stable and 
lasting peace in Colombia seem to have culminated in the 
Colombian government and the FARC quietly agreeing to consider 
the FARC’s narcotrafficking activities over the decades as a 
connected crime to their political crime of rebellion. As laid out in 
this article, the context of the peace negotiations, the peace 
agreement, and Transitory Article 67 of the Constitution support 
the theory that the Colombian government has agreed to connect 
the crime. Therefore, an agreement on this connection between the 
government and the FARC that circumvents the court system could 
lead to undesirable consequences both nationally and 
internationally.   
On the international level, Colombia could be ignoring an 
international obligation derived from the UN Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic of 1988. According to Article 3.10,  
[f]or the purpose of co-operation among the Parties 
under this Convention . . . . offences established in 
accordance with this article251 shall not be 
 
 251 ECOSOC, United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, (Dec. 19, 1998), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/49997af90.html. Article 3.1(a) establishes as 
criminal offences: 
i). The production, manufacture, extraction; preparation, offering, offering 
for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, 
dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic 
drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961 
Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention; 
ii) The cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant for the 
purpose of the production of narcotic drugs contrary to the provisions of the 
1961Convention and the 1961 Convention as amended; 
iii) The possession or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic 
substance for the purpose of any of the activities enumerated in i) above; 
iv) The manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment, materials or of 
substances listed in Table I and Table II, knowing that they are to be used in or 
for the illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances; 
v) The organization, management or financing of any of the offences 
enumerated in i), ii), iii) or iv) above. 
Article 3.1 (b) and (c), also considered as criminal offences, the following 
conducts: 
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considered as . . . political offences or regarded as 
politically motivated, without prejudice to the 
constitutional limitations and the fundamental 
domestic law of the Parties.252   
 
This is a safeguard clause that could open the door for 
Colombia to qualify the FARC’s narcotrafficking activities as 
connected political crimes and to derive consequences like non-
extraditions, amnesties and pardons. In principle, the Colombian 
Constitutional system operates within that safeguard clause. Even 
though the Colombian Constitution does not specifically mention 
any of the conduct related to narcotraffic as a connected political 
crime, the constitutional transitory disposition, Article 67, 
recognizes the concept of connected crimes and dictates that a 
 
i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from any offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph a) of this paragraph, or from an act of participation in such offence 
or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the 
property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such 
an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions; 
ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, 
knowing that such property is derived from an offence or offences established in 
accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of 
participation in such an offence or offences; 
c) Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal 
system: 
i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of 
receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or offences established 
in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of 
participation in such offence or offences; 
ii) The possession of equipment or materials or substances listed in Table I 
and 
Table II, knowing that they are being or are to be used in or for the illicit 
cultivation, production or 
iii) Publicly inciting or inducing others, by any means, to commit any of the 
offences established in accordance with this article or to use narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances illicitly; 
iv) Participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit 
and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the 
offences established in accordance with this article. 
   252    Id. 
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statutory law will regulate these types of crimes.253 In this context, 
the Constitutional Court of Colombia, as explained in section II of 
this article, stated that the legal benefits applicable to the main 
crime (e.g. rebellion) are extended to the connected crime (e.g. 
narcotraffic). Thus, the constitutional benefits granted to the 
political crimes in Art. 150.17 of the Colombian Constitution 
(amnesty and pardon), and in Art. 35 paragraph 3, (exception for 
extradition), are extended to the connected crimes.   
Therefore, the Colombian Constitution allows for any aspect of 
narcotrafficking to be considered a connected crime to the political 
crime (provided that the factual connection was established) 
creating a permissible exercise under Art. 3.10 of the UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic.  
However, the safeguard clause of Art. 3.10 of the Convention, 
is not to be read and applied as an open door to include any crime 
within the category of “political motivated” crimes. This article has 
a strict interpretation as reflected in the negotiations254 and in the 
commentary of the Convention. When referring to the Article 3.10 
prohibition to consider certain conducts related to narcotraffic as 
politically motivated crimes, the commentary on the Convention 
states that “this provision is intended to restrict the possibility of an 
individual invoking the protection of the so-called political offence 
exception” in circumstances such as terrorism and “other like 
circumstances.” 255 That assertion in the Commentary is based on 
General Assembly Resolution S-17/2, where the States expressed a 
concern of the “growing link between illicit traffic and terrorist 
activities.”256 
Therefore, categorizing conduct by the FARC prescribed in 
Article 3.1 (a) and (b) during phases four through six as 
“politically connected” to FARC’s rebellion “would be an obstacle 
to the provision of the measures of international cooperation 
provided for in articles 5 [Confiscation], 6 [Extradition], 7 [Mutual 
 
   253    See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 201. 
    254 For example, see Richard Vogler & Shahrzad Fouladvand, UN core 
Conventions on Transnational Organised Crime, in:INT’L L. & TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANISED CRIME 117-19 (2016).  
   255   ECOSOC, Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, at 98 (Dec. 19, 1998). 
   256    Id.  
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legal assistance] and 9 [other forms of co-operation and 
training],”257 something that the article was precisely designed to 
avoid. Specially, if read in conjunction with Article 24 which only 
allows for flexibility in the sense that the State Parties could take 
more severe or stricter measures that those mandated in the 
Convention, it does not allow for flexibility to ameliorate the grave 
nature of the offences in Article 3.1 (a) and (b).  
Reading and applying Articles 3.10 and 24 together shows that 
the drafters of the Convention, including Colombia after 
ratification, agreed that there is a link between illicit trafficking 
and politically motivated crimes,258 but they also acknowledged 
that “an act carried out in a political context (such as an armed 
uprising) may not be regarded as political if done for a private or 
personal reason.”259 This does not mean that the safeguard clause 
contained in Article 3.10 does not have any effect, but that it has a 
limitation in the scope of application when the connection of the 
conduct is non-existent and therefore cannot be categorized as a 
connected crime.  
In these terms, Colombia may be breaching an international 
obligation. The general principle of international law of pacta sunt 
servanda bona fides requires not only compliance with the 
international obligation but also good faith.260 Qualifying FARC´s 
narcotrafficking activities as a connected crime, without 
considering the real extent of the group’s involvement in every 
phase and the real degree of connection according to the test that 
the State decides to apply, put Colombia in breach of this 
international principle articulated in Article 3.10 of the Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic.     
On a national level, the consequences for qualifying 
narcotraffic as a connected crime goes directly to the terms, 
obligations, and aspirations of the Peace Agreement. The analysis 
presented in this article is based on the reality of what Colombia 
has undergone during the armed conflict and is still undergoing as 
part of the Peace Process between the government and the FARC. 
 
 257 Id. at 96.  
 258 See generally id.  
 259 Id. at 96. 
 260 ANTHONY AUST, PACTA SUNT SERVANDA (Oxford Public International 
Law 2007). 
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Colombia signed a Peace Agreement to transition to a “stable and 
permanent peace” in 2016. In order to achieve the desirable peace, 
a system needs to be put into practice. This system is universally 
known as the Transitional Justice System (TJS). 
Every TJS is different and there is not a unique formula to 
implement it. However, the tools commonly used are designed for, 
and envision, the desired peace. Thus, regardless of the form and 
mechanism used by the society undergoing a transition to peace, 
the ideas of adequate accountability, reparations to the victims, and 
reconciliation between perpetrators and victims are always an 
important element to achieve peace. 
The government of Colombia and the FARC during the 
negotiations selected the tools to be implemented as this TJS. The 
Colombian Peace Agreement explicitly creates, “the integral 
system of truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition,” a system 
that would be composed of several mechanisms and measures like 
the Truth Commission, the Special Unit for Enforced 
Disappearances, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the Measures of 
Integral Reparations, and Guarantees of Non-Repetition.261 Despite 
this selection of mechanisms and tools, Colombia still needs to 
form them, create them, and give them a legal and institutional 
framework to operate and achieve the desired “permanent and 
stable peace” agreed on by the government and the FARC. 
As said before, Colombia has already decided that the TJS 
would seek the disclosure of truth of the events that took place 
between the armed actors and against the civilians during the more 
than five decades of armed activities. Further, it would seek to 
achieve the peaceful coexistence between Colombians, and it 
would seek guarantees of non-repetition. Thus, narrowing every 
tool could only attain the goals sought and envisioned.  
In light of narcotraffic as an important element of Colombian 
history and a major problem of the Colombian society, one that 
surpassed the common criminality and contaminated groups like 
the FARC, narcotraffic crime cannot be ignored in the 
implementation of the truth mechanisms, special jurisdiction 
 
 261 Final Accord for the End of Conflict and the Construcion of a Stable and 
Lasting Peace 8 (Nov. 24, 2016), available at 
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/ 
Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf. 
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mechanisms, the reparation mechanism, and the mechanism for 
guarantees of non-repetition. Particular to this assertion, the 
Government and the FARC included the issue of illicit drugs with 
the intention to find a “Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs” as 
part of the issues to negotiate at the table in Havana, demonstrating 
that both parties recognized the role of narcotrafficking in the non-
international armed conflict in Colombia, implicitly FARC’s 
involvement, to a certain extent, with the crime of illicit trafficking 
or narcotrafficking. 
Despite the title “Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs” and 
the intention to address “coca eradication and crop substitution, 
public health and drug consumption, and the solution to the 
phenomenon of drug production and trafficking”, neither the 
agenda nor the peace agreement expressly mentions the disclosure 
of the FARC’s involvement in narcotrafficking or the 
accountability of their narcotrafficking activities.  
Even if we agree that defining criminal conduct in a 
transitional justice system is a dilemma between law and 
politics,262 in the context of Colombia we cannot ignore the 
commission of this crime. As we argued primarily on this article, 
the decision to qualify FARC’s illicit drug trafficking, as a political 
connected crime to the crime of rebellion, requires a complete 
picture of the facts, and it could not be considered a politically 
connected crime in some phases of the organization’s history. 
Thus, the opportunity opened by the Amnesty Law, to approach 
this by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, should be taken seriously 
and should not be influenced by the terms used in the Final 
Agreement and the Amnesty Law which could compel the 
conclusion that the FARC´s narcotrafficking activities were 
committed entirely for the purposes of financing its rebellion. 
In conclusion, looking at the parties’ intentions at the 
negotiation table, the purpose of the peace agreement, and the 
values underlying the Transitional Justice System selected by 
Colombia, narcotrafficking has to be part of the process, and 
discussed openly with appropriate criminal accountability for the 
FARC’s activities. This is required if non-repetition is to be 
 
 262 Kai Ambos, The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic 
Study with Special Focus on the Role of the ICC, in BUILDING A FUTURE ON 
PEACE AND JUSTICE, 19, 23 (Springer et al. 2009).  
62 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:2 
 
guaranteed, if a real reconciliation in the Colombian society is 
desired, and if a real, stable, and permanent peace is to be 
achieved. 
 
